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Social capital and corporate social responsibility (CSR) have received increasing attention in research on 
the role that elements such as trust, trustworthiness and social norms of reciprocity and cooperation may 
have in promoting socio-economic development. Although social capital and CSR seem to have features in 
common, their relationship has not yet been analysed in depth.  This paper investigates the idea of a 
virtuous circle between the level of social capital and the implementation of CSR practices that fosters the 
creation of cooperative networks between the firm and all its stakeholders. By using both a theoretical 
approach  developed  by  considering  tools  of  network  analysis  and  psychological  game  theory  and  an 
empirical approach based on original evidence from three case studies, this study shows the role that 
cognitive social capital (understood as a disposition to conform with ethical principles of cooperation) and 
the adoption of CSR practices may have in promoting the emergence of sustainable networks of relations 
between the firm and all its stakeholders (structural social capital).  
 
Keywords: Social capital, Corporate Social Responsibility, Social norms, Network, Cooperation, Trust. 






                                                           
§ Department of Sociology and Social Research , University  of Milano - Bicocca  and EconomEtica , Italy 
¨ Department of Economics , University of Trento and EconomEtica, Italy 
Acknowledgments 
The analysis presented in this paper stems from research conducted within the joint project “Social Capital, corporate 
social  responsibility  and  local  economic  development:  a  theoretical  analysis  and  case  studies”  carried  out  by 
EconomEtica - University of Milano Bicocca and LaSER - University of Trento. We would like to thank all the project’s 
participants. Degli Antoni would like to thank also the Regione Lombardia for financial support related to the grant 




Aim of the paper 
Does  stakeholders’  social  capital  favor  the  diffusion  of  corporate  social  responsibility  (CSR)  good 
practices?  In  turn,  does  corporate  social  responsibility  positively  affect  the  social  capital  stock  of 
stakeholders and, more in general, of the community? By adopting a multidimensional approach to the 
concept of social capital and a contractarian approach to CSR, the present paper analyzes the relationship 
between these two concepts by considering the possibility of a virtuous circle involving CSR and social 
capital.  
Concepts and definitions 
A.  Cognitive and structural social capital 
In respect to the notion of social capital, two main dimensions have been identified in the literature. On 
the one hand, social capital is defined in terms of cooperative networks of relations (e.g. Coleman, 1988; 
Lin, 2001; Burt, 2002). On the other hand, the notion refers to cognitive factors (such as belief in others’ 
behaviour – e.g. Uphoff, 1999) or elements related to social norms of trust and civicness (e.g. Putnam et al., 
1993; Knack and Keefer, 1997). In this paper we  consider these two different dimensions and, following 
Uphoff’s classification, we distinguish between cognitive and structural social capital (Uphoff, 1999). In 
what  follows,  cognitive  social  capital  is  defined  in  terms  of  beliefs  (in  the  behaviour  of  others)  and 
dispositions to conform with ethical principles of cooperation. Beliefs depend on the behaviour that others 
have  already  exhibited  in  the  past  and  that  can  be  produced  or  reinforced  by  ethical  commitments 
undertaken by them, such as subscription to an agreement on an ethical principle. Dispositions mainly stem 
from the norms and values shared in the community; but they are also associated with micro elements 
such as genetic and psychological factors. Both beliefs and dispositions affect trust and the propensity to 
cooperate.  Structural  social  capital  is  defined  in  terms  of  social  networks  based  on  trust  and 
trustworthiness which connect agents together. Three main factors may promote the creation of structural 
social capital: a) beliefs that others will be cooperative, b) personal dispositions to cooperate and c) the 




                                                           
1 Our definitions of the two social capital dimensions differ from those proposed by Uphoff, although they also share 
some essential characteristics with them. Both our approach and the one adopted by Uphoff include the networks 
that contribute to cooperation in the structural dimension. According to Uphoff, cognitive social capital “derives from 
mental processes and resulting ideas, reinforced by culture and ideology, specifically norms, values, attitudes, and 
beliefs that contribute cooperative behavior” (Uphoff, 1999, p.218). We refer to cognitive social capital by considering 
only  beliefs  and  dispositions  and  show  how  they  affect  the  propensity  of  people  to  share  ethical  principles  of 
cooperation. 2 
 
B.  A contractarian approach to CSR 
In regard to the notion of CSR, we adopt a contractarian approach and define CSR as a “model of 
extended corporate governance whereby those who run a firm (entrepreneurs, directors and managers) 
have responsibilities that range from fulfilment of their fiduciary duties
2 towards the owners to fulfilment 
of analogous fiduciary duties towards all the firm’s stakeholders” (Sacconi, 2006a,b).  
This approach to corporate governance is rooted in a critical appraisal of the new-institutional theory of 
the  firm  (Williamson,  1975  and  1986;  Grossman  and  Hart,  1986;  Hart  and  Moore,  1990;  Hart,  1995; 
Hansmann, 1996). According to this theoretical framework, the firm emerges as an institutional form of 
“unified  transactions  governance”  which  aims  to  remedy  imperfections  in  the  contracts  that  regulate 
relations  among  subjects  endowed  with  specific  assets  that  may  create  a  surplus  if  combined.  These 
contracts are characterized by incompleteness. A risk of opportunistic behaviour by the party in a stronger 
ex post position thus arises. Parties who expect to be expropriated will have no incentive to undertake their 
investments at the optimal level. This expectation can generate a loss of efficiency at the social level. The 
firm tackles this problem by bringing the various transactions under the control of a hierarchical authority 
(the party which owns the firm), which, through ownership, is entitled to make decisions concerning the 
contingencies that were not ex ante contractible.
3 This party will invest its asset at an optimal level, since it 
is safeguarded against other stakeholders’ opportunism. However, the risk of “abuse of authority” emerges 
in relation to all the other “non controlling” stakeholders (Sacconi, 1999; 2000; 2006a,b, 2010a) and it may 
generate inefficiency (e.g. the non controlling stakeholders will ex ante be discouraged from investing at an 
optimal level, while ex post they will resort to conflicting or disloyal behaviour in the belief that they are 
being subjected to abuse of authority). Consequently, the optimal level of investment cannot be realized 
and a less than second best solution arises. This result, which represents only a poor approximation to 
social efficiency, is associated with all the governance solutions based on the mere allocation of property 
rights to a single party.  
According to the contractarian approach adopted in this paper, this situation may be remedied and a 
first best solution may be achieved if fiduciary duties based on the residual control right are completed with 
further fiduciary duties owed to all the corporate stakeholders that face the risk of abuse of authority. From 
this perspective, the firm must be grounded on a rational agreement (the social contract of the firm) among 
all the corporate stakeholders whereby all the latter (the non controlling ones included) delegate authority 
to the stakeholder selected as in charge of running the firm. The social contract of the firm, however, not 
only contributes to defining the allocation of control over the firm, it also seeks to include in this structure 
other rights – essentially, responsibility claims in defence of non controlling stakeholders. The resulting 
                                                           
2 On the concept of fiduciary duty see Flannigan (1989) and Sacconi (2006a,b). 
3 Various factors - e.g. a comparative analysis of control’s costs of the different stakeholders - condition the decision 
on the party that must have this authority. See Sacconi 2006 and Sacconi 2010a for a discussion of this issue. 3 
 
institutional structure specifies the principles of the firm’s governance structure consistently with the idea 
of CSR as a governance model with multiple fiduciary duties (see Sacconi 2006a,b  and Sacconi 2010a,b  for 
a deeper discussion on the Rawlsian character of the social contract of the firm). Once the social contract of 
the firm has been agreed, in order to induce all the stakeholders to invest at an optimal level, the firm must 
develop a reputation for respecting fiduciary duties established by the contract. However, the development 
of a reputation is made difficult by the fact that interactions between the firm and its stakeholders take 
place in a setting characterized by incomplete knowledge about the firm’s action.
4 Because of incomplete 
knowledge,  it  is  impossible  for  the  stakeholders  to  verify  whether  the  firm  has  actually  behaved  in 
accordance  with  a  concrete  commitment;  consequently,  it  is  impossible  for  the  firm  to  develop  a 
reputation. In order to avoid the consequences caused by incomplete information about the reputation 
formation, the firm must adopt principles and rules of behaviour (a CSR principle, norm or standard of 
behavior) that explicitly establish the fiduciary duties accepted in the hypothetical social contract among its 
stakeholders. These state general principles whose contents are such to elicit stakeholder consensus, as 
well as explicit commitments to comply with principles and rules known ex ante by stakeholders. It is the 
CSR standard of reference that allows the social mechanism of reputation to function properly by enabling 
stakeholders to increase their trust in the firm and in its compliance with CSR principles. A reputation for 
fair behaviour is created only if the actual behaviour of the firm is consistent with the declared principles 
and  precautionary  rules  of  behaviour.
5  However  the  reputation  mechanism  is  fragile:  it  depends  on 
information that is typically fuzzy; and it also rests on the comparison between short term incentives to 
abuse and the long run benefits from a fair and cooperative behaviour, which must be weighted for a 
discount time factor. Moreover, possible reputations (and reputation equilibria) are always multiple, and 
there is no reason to believe that a firm will try to select a perfectly fair reputation if a reputation for 
moderate defection from commitments is deemed sufficient to prevent stakeholders from ceasing their 
cooperation with the firm.
6  
The contractarian approach is adopted to investigate the relationship between social capital and CSR for 
two main reasons. First, because the contractarian approach makes it possible to identify a criterion for 
defining a balance among the firm’s stakeholders, which is one of the main criticisms brought against multi-
stakeholder  approaches  in  running  firms.  Second,  because  the  social  contract  highlights  the  relations 
                                                           
4 On the theory of reputation under unforeseen contingencies see Sacconi (2000 and 2007b). 
5 For design of a CSR norm and management standard corresponding to the features now defined see for example 
Sacconi DeColle Baldin (2003) and Clarkson Centre for Business Ethics (2002). 
6  On the fuzzy nature of information on which reputation is based in a context of unforeseen contingencies see 
Sacconi (2000, 2007b). “Moderate defection” and multiple reputation equilibria are discussed in Sacconi (2007a) and 
mainly  Sacconi  (2011),  which  also  explains  how  conformist  preferences  and  the  sense  of  justice  complement 
reputation in ensuring the firm’s compliance with  CSR principles and standards of behavior, especially in the selection 
of the fair  repeated game equilibrium  among the many possible. 4 
 
between our concepts of social capital and CSR. In fact, as we will explain in detail, it is the social contract 
which makes it possible:  
i) to activate the stakeholders’ conformist dispositions with respect to compliance with the social contract 
which are an element of our notion of cognitive social capital;  
ii) the formation of the stakeholders’ beliefs (both as  prior beliefs and ex post beliefs  - i.e. based on 
repeated observation of the firm’s behaviour over repeated plays) about the firm’s conformity with the 
social contract (beliefs which constitute the second element of our definition of cognitive social capital) 
that takes compliance with CSR principles and standards as its reference point; 
iii) to explain the self-supporting decision of the firm to engage in repeated cooperation so as to maintain 
cooperative relationships with all its stakeholders  (which completes  our definition of structural social 
capital as a network of mutually cooperative relationships between the firm and all its stakeholders).  
Hypotheses   
This article assumes three main theoretical hypotheses:  
a) In line with the burgeoning literature in behavioral economics, we hypothesize that the economic 
agents’ motivations and preferences system is complex and irreducible to mere rational self-interest, even 
if  a  self–referenced  material  consequence  may  be  an  important  part  of  it.  Dispositions  to  act  in  a 
deontological way – that is, to conform with principles of fairness – are also part of the motivational fabric 
of the socio-economic agent, although their activation is contingent on conditions such as the reaching of 
an (at least hypothetical) impartial agreement and the formation of beliefs about other agents’ reciprocity 
in conforming with such principles and norms (i.e. we allow room for not purely deontological behavior “in 
isolation”). We assume that the “social contract of the firm” amongst the corporate stakeholders over a set 
of principles of fairness and norms of behavior, as they are translated into and implemented through the 
adoption of a set of CSR standards of governance and socially responsible management, under additional 
conditions to be specified, is able to activate and make effective the agents’ (stakeholders’) disposition to 
conform and reciprocate compliance with ethical principles of  fairness and cooperation (this disposition is 
an element of our notion of cognitive social capital).  
 b) the firm-stakeholders’ social contract – as expressed by the adoption of CSR principles, standards of 
governance and managerial tools (we will use also the expression “CSR practices”) – is also the basis for the 
formation  of  stakeholders’  beliefs about  the  level  of  the  firm’s compliance with  CSR  principles of  fair 
treatment in respect to all its stakeholders (this belief is the second component of the idea of cognitive 
social capital adopted in this paper). First, the adoption itself of such principles and rules of behavior, 
managerial standards and tools induces the prior belief that the firm will conform with the CSR principles in 
so far as such beliefs stem from default reasoning.  The simplest mental model (mental representation) of a 5 
 
player who agrees on the “social contract” also contains the representation of an intention to comply with 
the agreement under the intended circumstances (at least) until proof to the contrary arises. Thus the 
default inference ensues that this is the normal model of a player (e.g. it is assumed for the sake of 
simplicity that players “equal”, which entails that any whatever player will conform with the agreed social 
contract under the same conditions). Second, such beliefs are ex post confirmed or disconfirmed by the 
repeated observation of the firm’s behavior in the iterated interaction not only with strong stakeholders 
(who, according to the definition proposed in the text, are stakeholders who bring into the firm essential 
assets and with whom the firm has a strong interest - a business interest, in terms of material gains - to 
develop and maintain cooperative relations of mutual advantage), but also with weak stakeholders (who 
are defined as stakeholders interested in cooperating with the firm, whilst the latter prefers to abuse them 
repeatedly in their relationships) through a network of imperfectly cooperative relationships within which 
the firm is embedded.  
c) Taken together (i) conditional dispositions to conform with fairness principles and (ii) conformity 
beliefs  are  the  basis  for  developing  psychological  preferences  for  reciprocal  conformity  (what  we  call 
“conformist preferences”) with CSR principles and rules. At least in the case of strong stakeholders, these 
preferences  are  sufficiently  strong motivations  to  induce  them  to  act  as  enforcers of  the  cooperative 
relationship with the firm, based on reciprocal conformity with the set of ethical principles established by 
the social contract in regard to the treatment of all the firm’s stakeholders. This means not only that such 
stakeholders cooperate with the firm when it complies with its set of CSR principles and rules of behavior, 
but  also  that  the  firm  is  severely  punished  when  compliance  is  not  fulfilled.  Note  that  there  is  no 
assumption that this role of spontaneous enforcer is performed because of simple self-interest of the 
strong stakeholders. They act on psychological preferences (defined in the paper) that are irreducible to 
simple self-interest. We call “cognitive social capital” a combination of dispositions to conform with norms 
of fairness and beliefs about reciprocity in conformity. Overall, this type of social capital becomes effective 
when the disposition to reciprocate conformity with social norms of fairness (at both corporate and the 
wider  social  community  level)  is taken  in  conjunction  with  beliefs  about  reciprocal  conformity  on  the 
corporate level.     
Methodology  
The analysis is developed at both a theoretical and empirical level. The theoretical analysis is carried out 
by using tools of network analysis
7  and (psychological) game theory. The relationship between the firm and 
its  stakeholders  and  the  role  of  CSR  and  cognitive  social  capital  in  favouring  structural  social  capital 
                                                           
7 For a different use of networks in business ethics see R.Phillips (2010). Even though the general intuition about the 
role of networks in fostering CSR may be similar, our approach based on a  network  of games is quite different and 
our result doesn’t rely on ‘communication’. 6 
 
formation are modeled by considering a network of relations where agents interact repeatedly by playing 
different  games.  The  empirical  analysis  is  based  on  original  case  studies  concerning  three  Italian 
organizations operating in the large-scale distribution sector. By administering anonymous questionnaires 
to  different  organizations’  stakeholders,  we  analysed  the  relationship  between:  the  degree  of  CSR 
practices’ implementation by the organizations, stakeholders’ cognitive social capital and structural social 
capital between the firm and its stakeholders.  
Main results 
On the theoretical level, we show that not just cooperative relationships between the firm and the 
strong stakeholders can be sustained endogenously; but so too can cooperative relationships with weak 
stakeholders. In other words, we can show that a network of mutually cooperative relationships is made 
sustainable, even though self-interest would imperfectly sustain bilateral cooperation between the firm 
and at least a substantial subset of its stakeholders (the weak ones). This ensues simply because of the 
endowment of cognitive social capital of some of the network participants in terms of disposition to comply 
with ethical principles and social norms of fairness, and mutual beliefs about reciprocity in compliance, 
both of which are triggered by endorsement of the stakeholders/firm social contract on CSR principles and 
standards of behavior.  
On the empirical level,  first we show that the adoption of CSR principles and norms, management 
standards and tools seem to be related to the presence of stakeholders who possess what we can identify 
with a high disposition to conform with social norms of fairness and cooperation – that is, a cognitive 
component of social capital. This may be interpreted as follows: adoption of CSR principles and managerial 
tools by the firm are related to the anticipated relevance and intensity of the stakeholders’ response, e.g. 
with the possible formation of stakeholders’ conformist preferences that support both positive cooperation 
and  negative  sanctions  against  defection.  Thus,  a  firm  that,  in  order  to  improve  its  cooperation  with 
stakeholders needs the incentive deriving from a positive reputation (which in turn entails a cooperative 
beneficial  response  by  its  stakeholders),  will  be  more  inclined  to  undertake  CSR  in  the  presence  of 
stakeholders endowed with a high level of dispositions (cognitive social capital).  Secondly, we show that 
firms that more strongly adopt CSR principles and management rules - when they are associated with 
stakeholders endowed with high dispositions to conform with social norms, and these stakeholders also 
believe that the firm is complying with CSR principles - are fair in their treatment not only of their strong 
stakeholders, who are able to retaliate in the case of abuse, but also their weak stakeholders, who do not 
have that capacity. For example, a firm maintains a long run cooperative relationship with employees not 
“essential”  and  irreplaceable  for  the  company.    We  infer  from  our  observational  data  that,  since  the 
explanation for this behavior cannot be provided by material long-run interests in mutual cooperation with 
weak  stakeholders,  the  driving  forces  are  conformist  preferences  of  at  least  strong  stakeholders  that 7 
 
constitute an effective threat against the firm’s defection with weak stakeholders.  Given our observation 
about CSR adoption, the stakeholders’ high level of dispositions and conformity beliefs,  this inference 
seems warranted. “At least” means here that we can economize with an analogous hypothesis about the 
management of the firm or its owners’ preference. However, this more optimistic hypothesis concerning 
nearly symmetric conformist preferences on the part of the firm cannot be excluded, and if it were true it 
would imply conclusions even more consistent with our observations. 
Originality in respect to the related literature  
Only a few and recent papers have focused on the relationship between social capital and CSR. From a 
theoretical point of view, we may refer to two main studies. Aoki (2010b) proposes a game-theoretic 
approach which endogenizes the relevance of social constructs such as (individual) social capital, norms, 
and status ascriptions to firms’ economic behavior and discusses how corporate social capital accumulated 
through corporate social responsibility programs can compensate the pecuniary costs of CSR programs; 
how the former can nonetheless indirectly complement the accumulation of the latter; and how the former 
can become an insurance against an institutional change in environmental rights distribution. Perrini and 
Russo (2010) adopt Putnam’s definition of social capital in terms of “connections among individuals—social 
networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them” (Putnam 2000, 19) that 
“can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating co-ordinated actions’’ Putnam (1993, p.167) and argue 
that this notion  may be useful for understanding the concept of CSR in relation to SMEs instead of the 
prevailing understanding of CSR in terms of stakeholder theory.  However, in this paper social capital and 
CSR are not clearly distinguished – and it could not be otherwise, given its abandonment of normative 
stakeholder  theory  in understanding  CSR –  and social capital is used as a “passepartout” which makes it 
possible to interpret virtually all informal responsible behaviors or aptitudes of SMEs not connected with 
the adoption of an explicit CSR standard. 
From an empirical point of view, a recent contribution by Degli Antoni and Portale (2010) focuses on 
social cooperatives and analyzes the relationship between corporate social responsibility and social capital, 
showing that the adoption of CSR good practices (in terms of the implementation of a multi-stakeholder 
ownership and of the adoption of CSR formal instruments such as ethical codes and social reports) fosters 
the creation of workers’ social capital understood as cooperative social network, generalized trust and 
relational skills.  
The  present  paper  differs  from  the  previous  ones  and  contributes  to  the  understanding  of  the 
relationship  between  social  capital  and  CSR  in  many  respects.  It  takes  explicit  account  of  the 
multidimensional nature of social capital and analyzes at theoretical level the relationships between CSR 
and the various dimensions of social capital (a similar perspective may be found in Degli Antoni and Sacconi 
(2011)).  In  this  regard,  it  provides  a  complete  theoretical  framework  capable  of  interpreting  the 8 
 
relationship between these two concepts according to a wide and general theoretical perspective, and it 
gives an analytical basis to the intuition that both social capital and CSR  affect the creation of cooperative 
networks of relations not based solely on self-interest.  Moreover, it sets out an exploratory empirical 
analysis based on case studies aimed at assessing the theoretical model.  
Outline of the paper 
The  structure  of  the  paper  is  as  follows.  We  introduce  our  analytical  framework  by  presenting  an 
exemplificatory network involving the firm and its strong and weak stakeholders, and by using the tools of 
game  theory  to  give  a  simple  representation  of  these  relationships.  After  discussing  the  relationships 
between  the  firm  and  its  stakeholders  by  only  considering  material  payoffs  stemming  from  their 
interaction, we introduce the possibility that agents endowed with conformist preferences may obtain a 
positive ideal utility by cooperating with agents who contribute to fulfilling ideal principles of fairness. We 
then show how cognitive social capital and the adoption of CSR practices may allow the creation of long 
term cooperative relationships between the firm and all its stakeholders who would not be sustainable 
otherwise. Finally, we present some original case studies and evidence collected by the authors to discuss 
the theoretical model from an empirical point of view. The final section concludes. 
 
The relationship between the firm and its stakeholders 
An original distinction between strong and weak stakeholders 
A preliminary and original distinction between strong and weak stakeholders which characterizes our 
theoretical approach must be discussed before we present our analysis of the theoretical relationship 
between social capital and CSR. The notion of “stakeholder” has been subject to different definitions and 
classifications. In this paper, we start from a definition of stakeholders as individuals or groups with a major 
stake in the running of the firm and who are able to influence it significantly (see Freeman et al. 2010) and 
we  adopt  the  distinction  between  stakeholders  in  the  strict  or  in  the  broad  sense  (Sacconi  2006b). 
Stakeholders in the strict sense have an interest at stake because of specific investments made in the 
transactions of the firm (in the Williamsonian sense). Stakeholders in a broad sense include stakeholders 
who do not directly participate in any transactions with the firm but undergo the “external effects” of the 
transactions performed by it.  
However, within the category of “strict” stakeholders, we draw an original distinction between weak 
and strong stakeholders. The difference between weak and strong stakeholders concerns the consequences 
that cessation of the relationship with the firm produces on the stakeholder and the firm.  9 
 
·  Weak stakeholders make specific investments in their relationship with the firm that add a surplus to 
the transaction value. The value of this investment can be lost if the cooperative relationship with the 
firms stops. Thus they are locked into their relations with the firm. In accordance with the Prisoners’ 
Dilemma  logic,  in  order  to  be  able  to  gain  from  cooperation  (and  specific  investments),  they  put 
themselves at risk of being expropriated by the firm’s opportunistic behaviour. So far, however, they 
are not necessarily weak, which would not be the case were the firm in a symmetrical position (as 
happens in many repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma games). Their weakness instead stems from the fact 
that  their  investments  do  not  bring  essential  assets  into  the  firm,  whereas  the  firm’s  assets  are 
essential to their investment (Aoki, 2010a) – e.g. whilst realisation of the value of their investment 
depends on the continuing cooperation of the firm, if (at a cost) they decided to exit the relation they 
could be substituted by the firm at not prohibitive costs. This does not mean that the cessation of 
cooperation is not costly to the firm; it simply means that it is not sufficiently costly to incentivise the 
firm to maintain a fully cooperative behaviour in the long run. Put differently, the threat to interrupt 
cooperation is not effective in the case of weak stakeholders. Analytically, weak stakeholders would 
profit from cooperating “forever” with a cooperating firm, but the discounted payoff that the firm 
obtains from cooperating forever with them is lower than the payoff that it obtains by defecting at 
whatever stage (by expropriating the stakeholders’ specific investments) and never cooperating again - 
i.e. continuing a distrustful  relationship  or replacing  them with other stakeholders (even if these are 
less  productive  then  the  previous  weak  stakeholders  because  they  have  not  made  specific 
investments).  Note that here  “defecting”, as opposed to “cooperating”, means violating the mutuality 
of obligations in any given implicit or explicit agreement of cooperation, and acting so as to obtain all 
the surplus generated through an interaction with another agent, without sharing any part of it in order 
to remunerate her/his contribution. Hence, in this context, defecting does not necessarily imply the 
immediate severing of the link which connects the firm and the stakeholder. Assume that it is an 
employment contract or a supply chain long-term contract.  “Defecting” would mean that the firm 
extracts the entire surplus deriving from the weak stakeholder’s investment if the latter continues with 
cooperative conduct by fully honoring its contractual commitments. But if both the players “defect”, 
the relationship is not necessarily ceased. In the long run, the firm may continue to impose conditions 
capable of extracting any surplus that may derive from the action of the worker or supplier; but these 
in their turn may reduce their (unobservable) effort to a minimum (to the level where the firm would  
be indifferent between maintaining  the inefficient contract or replacing the supplier or the worker 
with  less  productive ones  ).  This  would  be  a  long run  (defect,  defect) outcome, which  is  typically 
possible in equilibrium in any repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma. What makes stakeholders weak is that 
“defection”  by  the  stakeholder  cannot  be  part  of  a  conditional  strategy  deterring  the  firm  from 10 
 
adopting its “defect” strategy. Supply chain contractors in developing countries, unskilled workers or 
employees in delocalized plants are typical instances of weak stakeholders. 
·  Strong stakeholders are stakeholders in the strict sense that bring essential assets into the firm. That is, 
they are symmetrically necessary for realisation of the value of their specific investments. Thus, if one 
of these stakeholders (even if at high cost for itself) exited the relationship, because it is irreplaceable, 
the firm would suffer a huge (sunk) cost. Such stakeholders are, for example, institutional investors or 
highly skilled workers. Strong stakeholders are precious (in terms of assets brought into the firm) for 
the  firm  and  they  cannot  be  replaced  at  low  switching  costs.  For  this  reason,  the  firm  wants  to 
cooperate  repeatedly  with  cooperating  strong  stakeholders,  and  it  may  offer  them  contractual 
conditions aimed at minimizing the risk of interruption of the relationship with them. For instance, a 
firm may decide to offer skilled workers salaries that are higher than their reservation wages. In the 
same way, strong stakeholders prefer to cooperate with a cooperative firm in the long run rather than 
defect with it, since it is from the relationship with the firm that they may generate a surplus by 
investing their assets. In more technical terms (using the terminology of game theory), even though 
both of them could have an incentive to expropriate the other’s specific investment in the short run (as 
happens in the Prisoners’ Dilemma), nevertheless in the long run for each of them the difference 
between  the  discounted  payoff  obtained  by  cooperating  forever  (when  the  other  player  also 
cooperates) and the discounted payoff obtained by exploiting the other player’s cooperation at the first 
stage (and thus inducing mutual defection forever) is positive. However, in order to stress even more 
strongly the condition that cooperation is mutually advantageous to both of them, later on in the paper 
we will assume that the game characterising their interaction is not the typical Prisoners’ Dilemma, and 
that  both  the  firm  and  strong  stakeholders  do  not  have  material  incentives  to  defect  in  their 
relationship even in the short run.  
The network involving the firm and its stakeholders: 
We  start  our  discussion  on  the  theoretical  relationship  between  the  firm  (“enterprise”  E)  and  its 
stakeholders by considering a network where the firm is supposed to be linked with a strong stakeholder 
(Ss) and two weak stakeholders (Sw1 and Sw2) (Figure 1).  
As  in  Lippert  and  Spagnolo  (2010),  the  players  in  this  network  are  connected  by  playing  repeated 
standard Prisoner’s Dilemmas where the payoff structure implies the static Nash equilibrium (Defect
i,j, 
Defect
j,i) (Table 1). Players are assumed to have a discount factor δ < 1 related to payoffs stemming from 
their future interactions in the repeated games.
8   
 
                                                           
8 Additive separability of agents’ payoffs across interactions and across time is assumed for simplicity. 11 
 
TABLE 1  
The payoff matrix of the Prisoners’ Dilemma 
    Agent j 























i,j, " i, j Î N, i ¹ j  
To represent the players’ behaviour in the Prisoner’s Dilemmas, and consequently in the network, we 
introduce the following notation (see again Lippert and Spagnolo 2010). g
i,j is the net expected discounted 
gain obtained by agent i from the relation with player j and it represents the difference between the 
discounted payoff that agent i obtains by playing (Cooperate
i,j, Cooperate
j,i) forever and defecting and 
starting to play the static Nash equilibrium (Defect
i,j, Defect
j,i) thereafter: 


















A relation of player i with player j in which g
i,j < 0 is called a “deficient relation” for player i; a relation of 
player i with player j in which g
i,j ≥ 0 is called “non-deficient” for player i. A relation between i and j is called 
“mutual” iff g
i,j ≥ 0 and g
j,i ≥ 0; it is called “unilateral” iff either g
i,j < 0 and g
j,i ≥ 0 or g
i,j ≥ 0 and g
j,i < 0; and it is 
called “bilaterally deficient” iff g
i,j < 0 and g
j,i < 0.  The different kinds of relations possible between i and j 
according to the value of g
i,j are represented by using incoming and outgoing arrows. An incoming arrow to 
player  i  represents  a  non-deficient  relation  for  player  i  (i.e  g
i,j  ≥  0);  an  outgoing  arrow  from  player  i 
represents a deficient relation for player i (i.e g
j,i < 0). 
FIGURE 1 
An exemplificatory network involving the firm and its weak and strong stakeholders 
 
According to the previous definitions and analytical framework, we can easily interpret the relationship 
in Figure 1. The firm and the strong stakeholder have (coherently with the definition of strong stakeholders) 
SW2  3 
4 
5  SW1 
E  SS 12 
 
a mutual relation (they are linked by a bidirectional arrow): that is, both the strong stakeholder and the 
firm  would  like  to  cooperate  forever  with  each  other  in  their  relationship.
9  By  contrast,  the  firm  has 
unilateral relations with weak stakeholders: the latter want to cooperate repeatedly with the firm (g
Sw,E ≥ 0) 
while the firm does not have material incentives to cooperate with weak stakeholders (g
E,Sw < 0).
10 
In respect to the network represented in Figure 1, we are particularly interested in the conditions for the 
network’s sustainability. i.e. self-enforceability of cooperation throughout all the network’s nodes. In their 
2010 study, Lippert and Spagnolo state that, under perfect information (that is: every player observes the 
actions taken by any other player in the network), in a network like the one represented in Figure 1 - where 
each player unilaterally, but not necessarily bilaterally, prefers to cooperate in the long run with all his/her 
immediate predecessors, save for a pair (in our case players SS and E) who also have a bilateral incentive for 
long run cooperation - mutual cooperation would be sustainable (that is: all the players would cooperate 
with  each  other)  if  all  players  adopted  the  Multilateral  Grim  Trigger  strategy  (MGT  strategy)  and 
å Î ³
i R j
j i g 0
,  
S N iÎ " .  According  to  the  MGT strategy,  if  one  player  at  some  point  in  the  network 
defected with his/her immediate successor (with whom s/he has a deficient cooperative relation), all the 
network’s members (e.g. “multilaterally”) would trigger the grim sanctioning of their neighbors by shutting 
down cooperation forever. This in turn would involve a sanction against the first defector as well, because 
of the interruption of cooperation from his/her predecessor, who is a desirable cooperator for him/her 
(remember  that  the  defector  has  a  non-deficient  cooperative  relation  with  his/her  predecessor,  even 
though his/her relation is deficient with the successor). The MGT strategy thus provides an incentive not to 
deviate from ongoing cooperation to each member of the network that has a deficient cooperative relation 
with her/his immediate successors.  To be precise, according to the MGT strategy  
Every player 
S N iÎ  
1. starts playing C
i,j  i R jÎ " , 
2. continues playing C
i,j  
i R jÎ " as long as s/he observes C
m,n 
S N n m Î " , , and 
3. reverts to D
i,j  i R jÎ " forever otherwise. 
                                                           
9 Even though (see below) we do not interpret the relationship between the firm and the strong stakeholders as 
necessarily a Prisoner’s Dilemma, we may nonetheless conveniently use the previous analytical framework in terms of 
the net expected discounted gain g
i,j and in terms of graphical representation through incoming and outgoing arrows. 
10 To give a complete interpretation of the network in Figure 1 according to the previous definitions, we may imagine 
that: E is a Multinational Enterprise; SW1 are employees in a plant owned by E in a poor developing country where E 
has delocalised mature productive processes for some of the goods that it supplies to the global market;  SW2 is the 
first firm in the international supply chain for the furnishing of some item components that E continues to assemble at 
its plant located in a rich developed country; SS may be pension funds holding a significant share in E or high skilled 
core employees at the E’s headquarters, well unionised and with some threat power; 3 is a second order supplying 
firm within E’s supply-chain (i.e. a supplier firm of E’s direct supplier); 4 are employees of 3, and 5 are the developing 
country’s retailers who have as their best customers the 3’s employees (on the contrary, SW1 are paid so badly that 
they are too poor to be commercially attractive to retailers). 13 
 
Whilst the MGT strategy may be useful in general, we do not agree with the conclusion concerning the 
network’s sustainability in this case. Since in the network represented in Figure 1 the relation between SS 
and E is mutual, and no player beyond SS can sanction E, nor are there other players who can sanction SS if 
s/he deviates from his/her MGT strategy, there are no endogenous incentives for player SS to sanction the 
firm if it defects with the weak stakeholders. In other words, when the MGT strategy requires sanctioning 
behaviour  against  the  firm  if  it  defects  against  its  weak  stakeholders,  the  strong  stakeholder  (SS)  is 
paradoxically required to act contrary to rationality.  But then the threat to the firm implicit in player SS’s 
MGT  strategy  is  non-credible,  and  would  be  unable  to  prevent  E  from  “defecting”  with  its  weak 
stakeholders.  
In what follows, we will conduct deeper analysis of the games played throughout the network by the 
various players (in particular by SS, E and Sw1,2) and we will show: (a) the instability of the MGT strategy if E 
deviates from cooperation and (b) how the network depicted in Figure 1  may become sustainable by 
considering the possibility of a psychological game (based on cognitive social capital and CSR ) played by  SS 
and E.  
The “games” involving the firm and its weak and strong stakeholders 
Starting from the previous network, we formalize the relationships between the firm and its weak and 
strong stakeholders in terms of repeated games played by these players in the network.  
In respect to the relations between the firm and its weak stakeholders, we assume that they play 
repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma Games (hereafter also PDs) with the payoff structure described in Table 1. 
The firm could cooperate in the PDs with weak stakeholders where cooperating means underwriting long-
term contracts including guarantees that reassure weak stakeholders concerning their appropriation of an 
equitable part of the surplus produced. However, for the reason discussed above, by considering only its 
material incentives in the relationship with weak stakeholders, the firm (given its discount rate dE) always 
wants to defect in the PDs with weak stakeholders.  
In  regard  to  the  relationship  between  the  firm  and  strong  stakeholders,  we  have  in  mind  a  more 
composite situation where also weak stakeholders have a role (even if passive). We model the relationship 
between the firm and strong stakeholders by introducing in the analysis a modified version of the Trust 
Game, hereafter called G (Figure 2) which represents the relationships between two active players (the 
enterprise  -  named  E  -  and  a  strong  stakeholder  -  named  SS  -  who  ideally  represents  all  the  strong 
stakeholders) and a dummy player Sw (which ideally represents all the weak stakeholders). The intuitive 
idea behind this game is that the strong stakeholder may decide to enter or not to enter into a cooperative 
relationship with the firm by considering whether the firm will abuse or not abuse his/her trust, in regard 
not so much to his/her material payoff as to the overall distribution among the players of the surplus 
generated by the joint production of all of them,  the dummy player (SW) included.  14 
 
If SS decides to start a cooperative relationship with the firm, both of them must decide how to deal 
with the (dummy) weak stakeholder. They may behave in a “fair” or in an “unfair” way.  By playing “fair” (F) 
the strong stakeholder coordinates with E and SW  so as to produce a joint surplus  (equal to 6 in the 
numerical example presented in Figure 2),  but at the same time s/he moderates his/her claim to  the 
surplus and asks for a part of it (equal to 2 in the Figure 2) to be saved and given to the weak stakeholder 
later. It means that the strong stakeholder opts to allocate part of the surplus for the purpose of increasing 
the weak stakeholders’ payoffs to an equitable distribution in the PDs that the weak stakeholders will play 
with the firm in the further part of the network, where SW will become an active player interacting with the 
firm E.   
Likewise, by playing “fair”, also E acts so as to allow the joint  production of a surplus, and agrees to 
allocate part of it  to the goal of increasing the weak stakeholder’s payoff in the ensuing  PDs played with 
her/him. The interpretation is that by playing “fair” the firm is committed to using the part of the surplus 
saved in G in order to pay the weak stakeholder a fairer payoff for mutual cooperation in the following PDs. 
If both E  and the SS play “fair”, a positive share of the surplus (jointly produced by SS, SW and E)  is actually 
saved in G and it increases the total amount of payoffs that may be divided between the firm and weak 
stakeholders in the ensuing PDs wherein E and SW are the actual players. Note that this does not change the 
strategic structure of the ensuing PDs. It can be considered as only an addition to the payoff that weak 
stakeholders get conditionally on how the firm plays the PDs. In particular, if the firm decides to cooperate 
with the weak stakeholders in the PDs, the amount saved on behalf of SW in G (when both the firm and the 
strong stakeholder play “fair”) is effectively used to pay Sw more. Otherwise if the E “defects” with SW in the 
PDs,  the previously saved amount is “stolen” and goes to increasing the unilateral defection payoff gained 
by  E.  
By contrast, by playing “unfair” (U) the strong stakeholder decides to cooperate with the firm, but does 
not agree to save a positive share of the surplus for the weak stakeholder. In the same way, when the firm 
plays “unfair”, it refuses to save a positive part of the surplus produced to be used in the ensuing PDs 
played with weak stakeholders. Consequently, if both E and Ss play “unfair” they equally share the surplus 
(in the numerical example reported in Figure 2 they get a payoff equal to 3) and noting is saved for the SW. 
On the other hand, if E  (respectively SW) plays “unfair” while the SS  (respectively E) is playing “fair”, the 
former gets a payoff equal to 4, the latter a payoff equal to 2, and also in this case nothing is left to be paid 
to SW in the PDs.  
Finally, and this is a central point in our analysis, when the SS decides not to start a relationship with the 
firm (i.e. s/he plays Øe), the weak stakeholder gets a positive payoff (equal to 1 in Figure 2). This means 
that strong stakeholders who also care about the weak ones’ welfare and are aware of E’s cunning strategy 
to get around its candid self-restraint move, have an alternative to pursuing “full fairness”: to boycott the 
firm (not to start the relationship with it) on behalf of the weak stakeholders’ (second best) stakes in the 15 
 
transaction. By way of an example of a possible weak stakeholder situation, consider a small firm which, by 
incurring  a  positive  cost  (say  1),  converts  its  production  plant  to  become  a  dedicated  supplier  of  a 
multinational enterprise. After the specific investment is made, the multinational enterprise asks to change 
the supply contract; otherwise it will find a different supplier. In the worst case, this may generate a 
situation which is worse for the supplier than the situation before the specific investment (no surplus is 
allocated to cover the cost of its investment). By not starting the cooperative relations with E, the strong 
stakeholder prevents the weak (small supplier) from incurring this transaction cost. 
FIGURE 2 
The extensive form of game G representing the relationship between the firm and the strong stakeholders (the 
numbers in the column represent the payoffs obtained by SS, E, SW respectively). 
 
 
Given the payoff structure, the game depicted in Figure 2 has only one Nash equilibrium solution where 
SS enters and plays “unfair” and E plays “unfair” as well. This means that, as far as only material payoffs are 
considered,  the  weak  stakeholders  are  headed  for  a  null  payoff  in  this  game.  This  gives  even  more 
stringency to the argument put forward in the previous section about the ineffectuality of player SS’s MGT 
strategy as part of a self enforcing mechanism able to support cooperation in the network depicted by 
Figure 1. Player SS will never rationally punish the firm E because of its defection with regard to some weak 
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CSR and cognitive social capital favouring structural social capital formation 
Dispositions, beliefs and conformist preferences  
As long as only material payoffs are taken into account, we conclude that (i) as regards game G, the firm 
and its strong stakeholders will always collude by sharing among them all the surplus in G and not leaving 
anything  for  the  weak  stakeholder;  (ii)  as  regards  the  ensuing  PDs  games,  cooperative  relationships 
between the firm and its weak stakeholders cannot arise because the firm does not have incentives to 
cooperate. 
However, in our approach, the game presented in the previous section is only the material basis for a 
psychological game (see Genakoplos et al. 1989, and Rabin 1993) where players do not care only about 
material payoffs but are characterized by conformist preferences intrinsically depending on their reciprocal 
beliefs (Grimalda and Sacconi 2005; Sacconi 2007a). Agents with conformist preferences obtain a positive 
ideal utility by conforming with some ideal principles that they are willing to fulfil conditionally on the 
expected behaviour of other agents they are in relation with. The intuition behind the idea of conformist 
preferences may be formalized by specifying the overall utility function Vi of a generic player i endowed 
with conformist preferences: 
)] ( [ ) ( s l s T F U V i i i + =  
The  first  term  ) (s i U represents  the  material  utility  got  by  agent  i  in  state  s .  The  second  term 
)] ( [ s l T F i  represents the ideal utility and reflects the agent’s conformist reason to act as a disposition to 
conform  with  an  ethical  principle  conditional  on  the  expectations  of  reciprocal  conformity  with  it. 
Essentially, these reasons amount to a desire to conform with a principle T, as long as it is believed that it 
will be reciprocally conformed with – up to some level – by the agent itself and by the other agents that 
participate in the same interaction through the production (by means of the agents’ choices) of the social 
state of affairs s .  
T is the ethical principle with which agents want to conform.  
li is an exogenous parameter representing the importance attached by agent i to the ideal utility in 
respect to the material one. The higher li is, the more the agent i will be willing to conform with the 
normative principle T if s/he believes that the others will act coherently in order to conform with the 
principle. 
The role of beliefs (in the degree of conformity with the principle T of other agents) in affecting the ideal 
utility of agents and, consequently, their behaviour, is captured by the function F. Following Grimalda and 
Sacconi (2005), F is based on the idea of expected mutuality in conforming with the normative principle T. 
In a two-person game, F can be specified by considering two elements (see Sacconi (2007a) and Grimalda 
and  Sacconi  (2005)  for  a  formal  and  more  detailed  representation  of  F):  i f ,  which  is  the  index  of 17 
 
conditional conformity with the principle T of player i; j f
~
, which is the esteem that player i forms about j’s 
compliance with the principle T. These two indices determine F and the ideal component of the overall 
utility function of a player characterized by conformist preferences, so that the overall utility function is 
specified as follows 
)] , ( 1 )][ , (
~
1 [ ) , ( ) , , (
1 2 1 1 2 1
i i i i i j i i i i i i i i b f b b f b U b b V s l s s + + + =  
where 
1
i b  is the first order belief that player i has in the behaviour of player j. 
2
i b  is the second order belief 
about player j’s belief in the behaviour of player i. 
Both beliefs and dispositions have a key role in determining the ideal utility of agent i: 
a)  If i conforms totally with the principle T and believes that j will conform totally with the principle, 
then the ideal utility of i will assume the maximum value: 
i i l l = ´ ´ 1 1  
b)  If i’s conformity is not complete and i believes that also j will not conform completely, the value of 
the ideal utility will be lower than li: 
i i y x l l < - - ) 1 )( 1 (  
c)  Finally, if the conformity of one of the two agents is zero, the ideal utility obtained by agent i goes 
to zero: 
0 ) 1 )( 1 1 ( = - - i y l  
We  now  have  all  the  elements  needed  to  reinterpret  the  relationship  between  the  firm  and  its 
stakeholders by considering the role of CSR and social capital. In fact:  
·  we interpret the ethical principle T as the CSR principle agreed by the firm and its stakeholders in 
the social contract (where the firm agrees to respect fiduciary duties towards all its stakeholders). 
In a contractarian approach to CSR, a characterisation of the ideal principle T is given by the Nash 
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where  i d stands for the reservation utility that agent i can obtain when the bargaining process 
collapses.  
·  l is the agents’ cognitive social capital understood as dispositions to conform with ethical principles 
of CSR.  18 
 
·  Function F captures the belief of agents in others’ behaviour and represents the idea of cognitive 
social capital in terms of beliefs. 
The role of cognitive social capital and CSR in making fair behavior self-sustaining  
Let us reconsider the game described in Figure 2 involving the firm (E) and the strong stakeholder (Ss) 
when they are endowed with conformist preferences. We analyze how the possible combination of the 
players’ strategies taken in conjunction with their mutual (predictive) beliefs affect the ideal utility of Ss 
(note that in what follows beliefs correctly predict actions). 
If the strong stakeholder believes that the firm will behave fairly and that the firm believes that s/he will 
behave fairly as well, by “entering” and playing “fair” s/he will maximize the level of implementation of the 
ideal principle T. In fact, if the strong stakeholder plays “fair”, given that the firm plays “fair”, the material 
surplus  is  equally  shared  among  all  the  players  with  outcome  (2,2,2),    and  the  T  value  is  8    (e.g. 
8 2 2 2 = ´ ´ ), which is the maximum possible with respect to the alternative (in fact, if SW played “unfair”  
the outcome  would be  (4,2,0) with T = 0. Thus, when both E and Ss play “fair”,  the maximum ideal utility 
lSs, enters the stakeholder Ss overall payoff.  
To give an example of the calculation of the ideal utility, let us start with the ideal utility to be added to 
the  material  payoff  of  player  SS  because  of  his/her  conditional  conformity  index  and  the  expected 
reciprocal conformity index of the firm, namely  ) , ( 1
1
Ss Ss Ss b f s +  and  ( )
2 1 ,
~
1 Ss Ss E b b f + , as they are specified 
at each possible state of the game. Consider the previous situation, i.e. the strategy  Ss s = (e,FSs) of player SS 
given his/her first-order belief that E plays “fair”, (
1
Ss b  = FE), and his/her second-order belief that E believes 
that SS plays (e, FSs), (
2
Ss b  = (e, FSs)). In this case, the index of conditional deviation of player SS is: 
              T(e,FSs;FE) - T
MAX (FE)      T(e,FSs;FE) - T (e,FSs;FE) 
¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾ = ¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾  = 0 , 
                               T
MAX (FE) - T
MIN(FE)           T (e,FSs;FE) - T (e,USs;FE) 
In fact, by responding with (e,FSs) the strong stakeholder obtains the best possible T value conditional on 
E’s choice being “fair”, which implies a conditional conformity index 1 ) ; , ( 1 = + E Ss Ss F F e f . For the same 
strategy pair, by symmetrical reasons, the expected index of reciprocal deviation of player E is  
                          T(FE;FSs) - T
MAX (e,FSs)           T(FE;e,FSs) - T (FE;e,FSs) 
            ¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾   =      ¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾   = 0 , 
T
MAX (e,FSs) - T
MIN(e,FSs)           T (FE;e,FSs) - T(UE;e,FSs) 
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which implies that the expected reciprocal conformity index of the firm is  1 ) , ; ( 1 = + Ss E E F e F f . Thus the 
ideal utility of player SS for this strategy combination is the full weight l  (namely,  l ´ ´1 1 ).   
Using  the  same  method,  conditional  conformity  indexes  of  SS  and  expected  reciprocal  conformity 
indexes of E can be computed for each strategy pair, and the ideal utility of player SS can be derived. If SS 
believes that E will play “unfair” and that E believes that s/he will play (e,FSs), by playing (e,FSs) s/he obtains 
ideal utility 0 since, against a player E who plays “unfair”, entering and playing “fair” generates the worst T 
value. “Staying out” by ¬e, would have given an outcome (1,1,1,) with the highest value T=1  conditional on 
the “unfair” strategy played by E.  On the other hand, If SS believes that the E will play “fair”, and that E 
believes that s/he will play (e,USs), by playing (e,USs)  s/he still obtains ideal utility 0, since s/he engenders a 
poor value T = 0 whereas by playing “fair” s/he would have maximised it (T = 8). Moreover SS obtains an 
ideal utility also equal to 0 by playing the strategy (e,USs),when s/he believes that E will play UE and that E 
believes  s/he  will  play  (e,USs),  since    collusion  entails  a  outcome  with  the worst  T value  (0), whereas 
responding by “staying out” SS would have obtained the outcome (1,1,1) with a better value T = 1. 
An interesting case is when SS believes that E will play “unfair” and that E believes s/he will play (Øe). By 
“staying out”, SS obtains an ideal utility equal to  l  since not entering neutralizes any deviation form the 
maximum value of T that could be induced by E’s “unfair”  choice. At the same time, given that player SS 
“stays out”, the firm cannot deviate from the maximum value of T =1  by choosing whichever of its two 
strategies (the outcome is the same in both cases).  
Last, if SS stays out when s/he believes that E will play “fair” and that E believes that s/he will play Øe, 
then player SS scores a high deviation index -7/8, and hence his/her complementary conditional conformity 
index is low, that is, 1/8.  On the other hand, if E believes that SS “stays out”, it cannot do anything to 
improve  the  outcome  over  (1,1,1)  and  thus  T  =  1  is  the  maximum  value  attainable.  Thus,  the  firm’s 
expected reciprocal conformity index is 1, which combined with 1/8 allows SS to get only an ideal utility 
1/8l .  
To sum up, the only way for SS to be fully conformist is to “enter” and opt for “fair” if s/he believes that 
also E plays “fair”, but to stay out otherwise. This latter behavior is a very important consequence of the 
conformist preference model: staying out of an unfair cooperative relation can induce the relative best 
level of conformity if the “cooperative” choice is such that acceding to such a proposal of unfair behaviour 








The game representing the relationship between the firm and the strong stakeholder  
when ideal utility is considered  
 
 
with 0£k£1  varying in function of the reciprocal players’ prediction  
In  respect  to  the  firm,  player  E’s  indexes  of  conditional  and  expected  reciprocal  conformity  are 
computable by analogous reasoning on symmetric strategy pairs. There are, however, two non-symmetrical 
cases – (¬e,FSs), (¬e,USs) – where E predicts that player SS will choose (¬e) but that SS believes that E will 
choose either FE or UE. Then the firm’s “fair” strategy obtains ideal utility 1/8l , since when the firm 
predicts that the strong stakeholder will stay out, neither playing FE nor UE makes any difference to the 
value of T. However, what reduces overall conformity in this case is the low level of expected reciprocal 
conformity by SS, which by choosing ¬e scores the poor level 1/8 given that the enterprise chooses “fair”. 
By contrast, the firm’s “unfair” strategy, given that E believes that SS  will play Øe,  obtains the highest ideal 
utility l , since  as before, by choosing UE (as well as FE) the firm makes T as high as possible, but now also 
the choice Øe by SS makes T as high as possible given the firm’s predicted choice UE . 
Figure 3 includes in the overall payoffs of the players the ideal utility obtained in the different situations 
when they are endowed with conformist preferences (and the related beliefs). Whilst in the game with 
solely  material  payoffs  only  a  Nash  equilibrium  arises  –  i.e.  (e,U  Ss;UE)  –  it  is  now  evident  that  when 
psychological payoffs are considered, there are two more possible psychological Nash equilibria beyond 
(e,USs;UE).
11 They depend on the value of l and on the players’ system of reciprocal beliefs: 
                                                           
11  When the game is changed from a “material game” to a “psychological game” in which the players’ payoffs have as 
their  argument  not  just  the  material  outcomes  but  also  their  reciprocal  beliefs  concerning  their  choices,  the 
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1.  When lSs and lE are larger than 2 (given the payoff structure in our numerical exemplification of the 
game), Ss believes that E plays “fair”, E believes that Ss plays (e,FSs), and each of them has second (and 
higher)  order  beliefs  that  the  other  has  exactly  these  beliefs,  then  (e,FSs;FE)  is  a  psychological  
equilibrium.  In  fact  the  players’  mutual  best  responses  are  exactly  FE  and  (e,FSs).  Thus  mutual 
cooperative and fair behavior is endogenously sustainable in G.  
2.  Alternatively, when E believes that SS “stays out” and SS believes that E plays UE, and each of them  has 
second (and higher) order beliefs consistent with these predictions, if lSs is larger than 2, the strong 
stakeholder will prefer to “stay out” rather than enter and play whatever second move (note that in this 
case k=1, since both conditional conformity and reciprocal expected conformity indexes are 1). Then 
(¬e;UE) is also a psychological equilibrium. In this case, by staying out, the strong stakeholder allows the 
weak one to obtain a payoff (equal to 1) higher than the null payoff got by the weak stakeholder if the 
firm is “allowed to” to play the “unfair” strategy. Note that, because of the existence of this second-best 
“fair” psychological equilibrium, no condition on lE is required. 
It should also be noted that if SS plays ¬e  but believes that the firm E will play “fair”, even though (given 
¬e) E cannot do anything  better to  improve the value of T than play (indifferently) one or other of its two 
strategies, nevertheless SS could behave in a better way with respect to T maximization (indeed s/he could 
play “enter”). Thus, in this case, as already explained, k = 1/8 and the pair (¬e;FE) is not a psychological 
equilibrium. In fact, for this belief (e.g. that E plays “fair”) the relevant psychological equilibria would be 
(e,F Ss;FE) consistently with E’s belief that SS “enters” and plays “fair”. On the other hand, if SS continued to 
believe that E plays UE, but her/his second order belief was that E predicted that s/he would enter (and if 
this were consistent with E’s first and second order beliefs), then the relevant psychological equilibrium 
would be the old one, (e,U Ss;UE), where the stakeholder enters and then colludes with a colluding firm. In 
this case the overall payoff of both the players coincides with the material one. Nonetheless, this is a 
psychological equilibrium as well, because beliefs and the related conformity indexes reduce to zero the 
ideal utility components of overall payoffs, so that material payoffs are the only utility components that can 
drive the players behavior. 
The role of the CSR-social contract in triggering cognitive social capital and prior beliefs 
Cognitive social capital consists of dispositions to conform with social norms of fairness and mutual 
beliefs about reciprocal conformity with agreed principles. The effectiveness of the former is conditional on 
the formation of the latter, and agreement on CSR principles and rules of behaviour is (in our context) the 
necessary precondition for both.   
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
appropriate  equilibrium  concept  is  no  longer  the  Nash  equilibrium  but  the  Psychological  Nash  equilibrium  (see 
Genakoplos et al. 1989). Note that also the old equilibrium point (e,USs;UE) is a psychological equilibrium in the new 
context.  22 
 
In our approach, we study the relationship between the firm and its stakeholders by implicitly  assuming 
that, before the game described in Figure 3 is played, a phase of pre-play communication takes place 
(traditional game theory would consider this as a “cheap talk”, but we shall see that it has an important 
role in affecting the players’ preferences). In this pre-play communication phase, agents adjust themselves 
to the perspective of an ideal game “under a veil of ignorance” such that they are able impersonally and 
impartially  to  agree  on  a  principle  of  cooperation  devoted  to  settling  the  distribution  of  surpluses 
generated in interactions like the one involving the firm and its stakeholders. “Impersonality” is guaranteed 
because, by ignoring who will ex post assume whatever role in the game (for example the role of E, Ss or 
Sw), in order to decide how the “real life” division game will be played ex post, a CSR principle of fair 
division is ex ante agreed upon by anonymous agents (the players in the game). The equal power exerted 
by whatever player in agreeing, irrespectively of its real life role in the game  guarantees “impartiality” of 
the collective decision.    
From the motivational point of view, it is quite clear that it is because a player autonomously abides by 
an impersonal /impartial decision on a principle that s/he then recognizes being under the obligation of 
fulfilling  the  commitment  ensuing  from  the  agreement.  This  may  have  different  interpretations,  all 
compatible with the model: the content of the agreement is a reciprocal obligation, and the agreement is a 
way to focus on it as the prevailing (most salient) mode of behavior. Focussing by agreement triggers 
motivations, and pushes alternative motives to act into the background of the agent’s mind. Otherwise, a 
player agrees on a principle because s/he already has an independent reason (some interest or reason to 
act) for complying with it. Impartiality of the agreement can only reinforce this reason to act because it 
proves that this reason to act is invariant to the symmetric permutation of the individual viewpoint, i.e. by 
taking  in  turn  the viewpoints  of  any  participant  it does  not  change  –  it  is  unanimous  and  universally 
acceptable. Last, agents entering the agreement process have only the motivation to reach an impartial 
agreement with similarly motivated participants. The agreement must be based on impersonal arguments 
that participants give in favour of some solution or another. Their only endeavour is to acquire other 
participants’ rational, disinterested consensus -- on the expectation that everybody else will also accept a 
similar deliberative process. Since reaching such an agreement fulfils their desire, they are ready to act 
upon it, because it is the simplest way to act consistently with it.  Summing up, a fair agreement on a 
principle of justice activates a motivational drive (a disposition to act, or a set of attitudes  generating 
dispositions, that we can call “the sense of justice”) capable of generating a specific behaviour – so to 
speak, the “desire” to be just (act in conformity with a principle of justice). The intensity of this “desire” is 
what the model captures with parameter l.
12  
                                                           
12 The different positions exemplified here can be referred to different philosophical theories: the Humean theory of 
social  convections  (see  Lewis,  Bicchieri),  the  contractarian  theory  of  morals  based  on  fair  terms  of  agreement 
(Gauthier but, as it is treated in the text, also Rawls) and contractualism  (see Barry and Scanlon). The idea of a “sense 
of justice” is taken from Rawls (Rawls 1971). But the desire to be just can be retrieved directly from Kant’s Critique of 23 
 
From the cognitive point of view, the framing effect engendered by the agreement may be crucial. 
Framing  the  situation  as  one  of  impartial  agreement  affects  players’  beliefs.  The  impartial  agreement 
triggers a mental framing such that the current situation is recognized as belonging to a category wherein  
agents are treated impartially.  It happens that a mental model of the rational agent comes to the player’s 
mind. In this model, an agent having agreed on a principle will act in accordance with the obligation agreed. 
Hence the individual reasoner proceeds by default to the conclusion that there is no reason or evidence for 
not believing that whatever agent (let it be herself/himself and the counterparts) will envisage the situation 
according  to  the  same  mental  model.  The  framing  effect  induced  by  the  pre-play  agreement  phase 
amounts to entering the following normative mental model: “People who voluntarily agree on a principle 
or classify a situation as belonging to a category wherein a norm is valid, normally behave according to the 
agreed or valid norm”. 
Note that a logical proof that rational agents will necessarily act according to the principle does not 
exist. It is only the simplest mental model of an intentional agent that follows from having framed the 
situation as one of free impartial agreement. One may say that, if a generic agent freely agrees to a 
principle, s/he expresses the intention to act according to the principles and the obligations stemming from 
it. Consequently, until proof to the contrary, one may expect that the typical rational agent will “normally” 
act in conformity with the freely agreed principle.  All these are only default inferences, which may be 
accepted on the caveat that “normally”, “until proof to the contrary ,“there is no evidence to the contrary 
that” the typical agent will fulfil the agreed commitments. They are perfectly reasonable within the limits of 
these caveats, but are not valid deductive conclusions in terms of classical logic.
13 
Consequently, assume that this is  the stereotype of a rational agent under the current framing of the 
situation, e.g., it is the mental model that “comes to the agent’s mind” when s/he tries to decide rationally, 
the one s/he takes for granted or as provisionally true in planning his/her behaviour. Now imagine that the 
same agent is asked to forecast the behaviour of the other agents (for example the strong stakeholder is 
asked to forecast the firm’s behaviour). If contradictory information or evidence does not arise, by default 
the agent will simulate other agents’ reasoning and behaviour by replicating onto them the same mental 
model  used  to  provisionally  define  his/her  own  behaviour.  This  replication  has  the  same  fragile  but 
nonetheless intelligible basis as before: the simplest way in which we can forecast the behaviour of other 
agents is to simulate their behaviour through the best mental model of an agent that we have inferred 
from our framing of the situation.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
Practical Reason. For its incorporation into psychological game theory see  Sacconi and Faillo  (2010) and Sacconi 
(2011). 
13To be noted, however, is that even though the reasoning described cannot be considered as a valid inference in 
classical  propositional calculus, it nevertheless  obeys the inference rules of non monotonic logics such as default 
reasoning  (see Reiter 1980)  24 
 
Given the mental model just described, if players participate in the pre-play communication phase (the 
agreement  on  CSR  principles),  their  first  set  of  beliefs  in  the  psychological  game  will  consist  of  the 
prediction that players’ strategy choices are (e,FSs) for the strong stakeholder and (FE) for the firm, and 
mutual second order beliefs are consistent with these prediction about choices. This means that, when the 
firm and the strong stakeholders agree on some ethical principle of cooperation, we may suppose (believe) 
that they will start playing the game G described in Figure 3 in a cooperative and fair way, and that the first 
psychological equilibrium they should reach is the one where they play (e,F Ss;FE).  
The role of cognitive social capital and CSR in the sustainability of cooperation in the overall network of 
relations 
Thus far, we have discussed the game G as a one-shot game related to the PDs simply because the 
payoff  saved  in  the  G  was  intended  to  increase  the  weak  stakeholders’  payoffs  through  an  equitable 
distribution in the PDs that weak stakeholders play with the firm in further parts of the network. However, 
G is not a one-shot game. It is the stage game of a repeated game played by the firm and the strong 
stakeholder, and it is played simultaneously with the repeated PDs that the firm E plays with its weak 
stakeholders  in  the  remaining  parts  of  the  network.  This  has two  important effects  on  players’  belief 
formation in G. First, ex post beliefs depend on the behaviours observed in the previous plays of the same 
game G. Moreover, and this highlights the connection between G and the PDs, the strong stakeholders’ 
belief concerning the behaviour of the firm in the G is also affected by the firm’s behaviour in the PDs. In 
fact, the payoff saved for the weak stakeholders in G should be used by the firm E to improve the weak 
stakeholders’  condition  when  E  plays  the  cooperative  strategies  in  the  PDs.  If  the  strong  stakeholder 
observes  from  past  plays  of  the  PDs  that  the  firm  defects  against  weak  stakeholders  (thus  also 
appropriating unilaterally any amount of the surplus saved in G), then s/he will assume that neither is the 
firm conforming with the CSR principle in G, and that his/her best strategy in G (if conditions on lSs hold) 
becomes to exit cooperation with the firm. Thus in the stage game G the psychological Nash equilibrium 
(¬e;UE) emerges.  
This  analysis  clarifies  why  cooperation  is  sustainable  in  the  network  of  relations  of  Figure  1  when 
cognitive social capital and CSR are considered within the general framework of conformist preferences. As 
stressed above, as long as only material payoffs are considered, the assumption that players will adopt the 
MGT strategy in sanctioning their successors if any “defection” is observed in the network, requires the 
strong stakeholder (SS) to act contrary to his/her material incentives. In fact, the relation between SS and E 
is bilaterally advantageous and not deficient. Thus, when SS observes an opportunistic behaviour by the 
firm against weak stakeholders, there are no reasons (based on material incentives) which may rationally 
justify the strong stakeholder’s decision to punish the firm by halting the cooperation with it.  25 
 
On the contrary, we showed that, when ideal utilities are considered, the strong stakeholder’s decision 
to “stay out” of the relationship with the firm in order to punish it for its opportunistic behaviour against 
weak stakeholders is perfectly compatible with the incentives of player SS (e.g. it is “rational”). In particular, 
when the conditions on l are satisfied, under consistent reciprocal beliefs such that SS is predicted to “stay 
out” and E is predicted to play “unfair”,  a stage game G psychological equilibrium exists such that the 
strong stakeholder predicting unfairness by the firm (both in G or in the previous PDs) plays ¬e. This result 
grants consistency between implementation of the MGT strategy and equilibrium behaviour in G (e.g. in a 
relevant sub-game of the overall game that E plays with both strong and weak stakeholders).  
One last condition must be stated. In order for the decision to play ¬e to be a credible threat for the 
firm, the total payoff gained by E from the repeated games in which it participates must be considered. The 
combined total payoff (in terms of both material and ideal utility) that the firm E obtains in the long run 
when (i) the equilibrium played in each repetition of G is (e,F Ss;FE) and (ii) the firm also cooperates in each 
repeated PDs with SW , must be higher than E’s combined total payoff obtained in the long run when (i) the 
equilibrium played in each repeated  G is (¬e;UE) and (ii) the equilibrium in each repeated PDs is (Defect
i,j, 
Defect
j,i).  In  fact  (¬e;UE)  is  the  sanction  stage  of  the  MGT  repeated  strategy  of  player  SS  aimed  at  
discouraging  player  E’s  defection  from  fair  behaviour  toward  SW,  and  at  supporting    behavior  by  E 
consistent with (e,FSs;FE) and “cooperation” in the repeated PDs. Were this behavior not profitable to the 
firm, it would always prefer to defect in the PDs and face the retaliation from the strong stakeholder in the 
repeated G. To be sure, a wide array of parameters generally satisfy the required proportion between the 
firm E‘s overall payoffs in G and its material payoffs in the PDs, as in fact is true in the particular case under 
examination (see Degli Antoni and Sacconi 2011).  
 
Conformism, reputation and ex post belief formation  
We  previously  argued  that  a  prior  agreement  (the  “social  contract”)  on  CSR  principles  and  norms 
directly affects the players’ beliefs, so that the cooperative and fair equilibrium immediately arises in the 
one-shot game G. This is not just an assumption, because there is experimental evidence that this is in fact 
the case (see Sacconi and Faillo 2010, Faillo, Ottone Sacconi 2008).  To gain a complete explanation of the 
players’ beliefs that support the “cooperative and fair” solution of G, however, it must be considered, as 
stressed in the previous section, that G is the stage game of a repeated game played simultaneously with 
the PDs. Thus beliefs supporting psychological equilibria in G must be explained also on the basis of firm E’s 
behaviour throughout the repeated PDs played with its weak stakeholders SW. In order not induce SS  to halt 
his/her  cooperation  with  E  in  the  stage  game  G  (by  “staying  out”),  firm  E  must  maintain  the  good 
reputation of being a player who deals fairly and cooperatively with any Sw in each repeated PD.  
Let  us  assume  for  the  moment  that,  at  the  beginning  of  the  process,  player  SS  is  not  completely 
convinced about E’s conformity, and hence s/he plays “staying out”, and that also E believes that s/he stays 26 
 
out (e.g. the game starts in a region that is attracted by the psychological equilibrium (¬e;UE)). Remember, 
however, that we also assume that the firm’s long-run total payoff deriving from the summation of its 
overall payoffs from the repeated play of the equilibrium (e,F Ss;FE) at each stage of G with the material 
payoffs of mutual cooperation in the repeated PDs outweighs both (i) the total payoff deriving from adding  
the overall  payoffs of  repeated  “not started” cooperation in the stage games G to the  payoff of repeated 
mutual defection in all the PDS, and (ii) the total payoff deriving from adding the overall payoffs of repeated 
“mutual collusion” in the stage games G and the payoffs of mutual defection in repeated PDs. Hence it 
makes sense  for player E to try to build a reputation as a “fair co-operator”:  a player who always plays 
“fair” in G  (even if in initial periods an untrusting  SS may stays out) and always plays “cooperate” in the PDs  
(even if in initial periods an untrusting  SW may play “defect”). In fact, it  may eventually change the beliefs 
of player SS on the firm type, so that at some point in time s/he will start to “enter” the cooperative relation 
with E and then play “fair” in G.   
In general, however, the mechanism of reputation building is a fragile one. A great deal of information 
must  be  transmitted  in  order  unambiguously  to  verify  consistency  between  behavior  and  prior 
commitments. But specification of contingent commitments may be difficult ex ante. The discount rate d 
may be low, so that the likelihood of expected payoffs must be high in order to impinge significantly on the 
total player payoff.  Moreover, the typical sophisticated abusive behavior that simulates honest conduct, 
whilst instead abusing the stakeholder’s trust as many times as possible without reaching a breaking point 
where the stakeholder terminates the relationship, must be not an available option. Otherwise a self-
interested firm would prefer to develop more the reputation of being such a sophisticated abusive player 
than that the reputation of being a completely compliant player.  
In addition, the reputation building behaviour in our context confronts E with an actual cost because  
repeated cooperation in the PDs does not provide it with a real advantage with respect to the opportunity 
for benefit deriving from an occasional defection and a long history of mutual defection (e.g. the typical 
“folk  theorem”  argument  for    cooperation  does  not  work  in  this  case).    The  firm  thus  needs  some 
reinforcing  behavioral  mechanism  that  magnifies  both  the  strong  stakeholders’  positive  and  negative 
reaction to the “fair cooperative” or defective conduct by the firm, and the advantages  or punishment that 
the firm  can derive from such reactions.  
This is exactly the case when stakeholders (at least the strong ones) have a disposition to comply with 
social norms of fairness, e.g. they are endowed with a strong component of cognitive social capital. From 
this feature of stakeholders the firm derives an incentive to adopt CSR principles and standards of behavior 
in  regard  to  the  treatment  of  all  stakeholders  belonging  to  its  network  of  relationships.    In  fact, 
endorsement of the social contract with stakeholders may provide the second component of stakeholders’ 
cognitive social capital  - the prior beliefs that the company will conform with a firm-specific norm of 
fairness (see the previous section).  And this will activate the stakeholders’ conformist preferences. These 27 
 
in turn induce strong stakeholders to cooperate with the firm as reciprocation of its conformity, and they 
allow ideal utilities to enter into the firm’s overall payoff.  But at the same time they would induce strong 
stakeholders to sanction severely a firm that did not rigorously comply with its own CSR principles and 
norms. Since, when the beliefs are elicited, ideal utilities enter the overall players’ payoffs without delay, 
the firm does not have to wait long before experiencing  positive payoffs from the decision to abide with 
the CSR principles and norms of behavior. 
To explain, everything depends on the intensity of the players’ conformist ideal utilities lE  and lSs (i.e. 
the  utility “bonus” for  the “cooperative and fair” psychological equilibrium) and on the efficiency and 
speed  of  the  reputation  building    mechanism  which  permits  the  convergence  of  beliefs  toward  the 
“cooperative and fair” psychological equilibrium. If the parameter l is high enough and the agreement 
elicits  prior  probabilities  in  the  attraction  area  of  the  psychological  equilibrium,  then  the  cost  of  a 
reputation building strategy become sustainable, since quite early on beliefs reach the level that triggers 
the ideal utilities of player SS, so that it “enters” and offers the firm E an overall payoff 2+ l (>2) at each 
stage game G. Thus, even though playing the reputation building strategy may initially be costly for E, it is 
quite  soon  repaid  with  positive  overall  payoffs  that  more  than  counterbalance  the  cost  of  giving  up 
opportunities for unilateral defections in the repeated PDs. The key element is no longer the discount rate 
of future payoffs, but the level of l and its nearly immediate impact on player E’s overall payoff.  In sum, 
the firm has a higher incentive to adhere to a CSR principle and rule of behavior because this may engender 
higher payoffs, admitted the initial condition that the first component of cognitive social capital (disposition 
to comply with social norms) spreads through all its potential  strong stakeholders.  
Summing up, we may say that there is a “virtuous circle” between CSR and social capital: dispositions 
(preexisting cognitive social capital held by a set of agents embedded in a given society or community) 
favors the adoption of CSR principles and managerial standards of behavior on the part of a company 
operating within a network of relations. The endorsement of a social contract between the company and its 
stakeholders provides a second component of cognitive social capital, that is, beliefs concerning reciprocity 
of conformity. In conjunction with the first component, these engender conformist preferences, which is 
how we model “cognitive social capital” as a whole. This explains why in the overall network cooperation 
may  become  sustainable  even  if  bilateral  relationships  are  imperfectly  cooperative  (e.g.  unilaterally 
deficient) between the firm and some of its stakeholders participating in the network. The reason is that 
when the social contract has been endorsed, conformist preferences induce stakeholders to over-reward or 
over-punish the firm on the basis of its effective, observable through iterated plays, compliance with CSR. 
And this extends far beyond the bilateral relation of mutual advantage between the firm and its strong 
stakeholders and spreads throughout the network. Thus preexisting “cognitive social capital” creates the 
opportunity for the undertaking of CSR on the part of companies, but CSR also increases “cognitive social 28 
 
capital” and makes it possible the sustainability of cooperative relations throughout the overall network of 
social relations, e.g. it engenders what can be called “structural social capital”.   
 
Cognitive social capital, CSR and structural social capital: evidence from case studies 
The case studies 
In order to assess the theoretical model presented in the previous sections, we will refer to evidence 
from  three  original  case  studies.  They  concern  three  Italian  organizations  operating  in  the  large-scale 
distribution sector. Two of them are consumer cooperatives (we will name them “A” and “B”) while the 
third one is a joint-stock company (we will name it “C”). The two consumer cooperatives own supermarkets 
and hypermarkets in various Italian regions (A operates in four Italian regions and B in two), even though 
their headquarters are in the same North Italian region. The joint-stock company operates mainly through 
supermarkets in a north-eastern Italian region, where also its headquarters are located. 
Our empirical study involved three hypermarkets (one owned by organization A and two by B) and two 
supermarkets (both owned by C). The hypermarket of A is located near A’s headquarters. We will name it 
A1. The two hypermarkets owned by B are located in two very different places. One is located near the 
headquarters of organization B (we will name it B1), and one in a southern Italian region (we will name it 
B2). The two supermarkets owned by C are located in two nearby cities in the same region where the joint-
stock  company’s  headquarters  are  located.  Because  of  the  size  of  the  two  supermarkets  and  of  the 
homogeneity  of  the  context  in  which  they  operate,  we  will  consider  them  in  the  analysis  as  a  single 
observational unit (named C1).  
We  administered  anonymous  questionnaires  (in  the  presence  of  the  data  collector)  to  different 
organization  stakeholders.  We  will  focus  our  empirical  analysis  by  considering  evidence  from 
questionnaires filled in by consumers and workers of A1, B1, B2 and C1, and by the person in charge of CSR 
matters in each of the three organizations (A, B, and C). Questionnaires were completed by both consumers 
and workers randomly. In each hyper/supermarket we spent two days at the checkouts giving all the 
consumers who agreed to take part in the research project the opportunity to fill in a questionnaire. In 
regard to the workers, we collected replies from those who, after having been randomly contacted, agreed 
to participate in the project.  
The theoretical hypotheses 
Before  examining  the  empirical  results,  we  summarize  the  main  hypotheses  (stemming  from  the 
theoretical model) investigated using the empirical data.  
H1. Organizations  in contact with stakeholders (both strong and weak) endowed with high disposition to 
cooperate (l) with agents conforming with ethical principle of fairness and cooperation will have more 29 
 
incentives to adopt CSR practices than organizations operating in contact with stakeholders who are less 
endowed with l. Here the argument relates to the mechanism behind the creation of reputation. As 
previously pointed out, reputation requires a long time to be accumulated, and cooperation between the 
firm and its stakeholders may prevail because of reputation only if the impact of future payoffs on the 
actualized  utility  of  stakeholders  is  high.  Conformist  preferences  (and  the  ideal  utility  connected  with 
conformist preferences whose level strictly depends on  l) induce stakeholders to cooperate sooner with a 
“cooperative  firm”,  and  this  may  be  a  key  factor  in  fostering  the  adoption  of  CSR  practices  (see  the 
explanation  in  the  previous  section  “Cognitive  Social  Capital,  CSR,  conformist  preferences  and  the 
sustainability of all the network’s relationships”).  
H2.  The  more  the  firm  adopts  CSR  good  practices  and  respects  them,  the  higher  the  beliefs  of 
stakeholders (both strong and weak) in the fair (coherent with the CSR declarations) behaviour of the 
organization. In fact, if stakeholders verify compliance with CSR good practices by the firm, they should 
believe that the firm is actually conforming with CSR principles. Note that stakeholders’ beliefs in the firm’s 
behaviour  conforming  with  CSR  principles  are  formed  only  if  two  conditions  are  met.  First,  the  firm 
explicitly declares the CSR principles with which it wants to conform. Second, stakeholders may check 
conformity with the principles. If the firm does not adopt CSR principles, or does not make the check by 
stakeholders possible, stakeholders’ belief may not be formed. Moreover, if the firm adopts and does not 
respect CSR principles stakeholders’ belief will be of low compliance of the firm with the principles.  
H3. Organizations in contact with strong stakeholders endowed with a high level of l and believing that 
the organization conforms with CSR principles, will have incentives to respect CSR principles and to avoid 
opportunistic behaviour against weak stakeholders. After the organization has implemented CSR good 
practices, and after stakeholders have developed their belief in the fair behaviour of the organization, ideal 
utility should stem from the cooperative relationship between the organization and its stakeholders. In this 
context, if strong stakeholders observe that the organization is defecting against the weak ones, and if their 
l  is high enough to counterbalance the material loss deriving to stakeholders from cessation of their 
relationship with the organization, we should observe strong stakeholders discontinuing their relationship 
with  the  firm  in  order  to  punish  it  for  its  unfair  behaviour  against  the  weak  stakeholders.  Since 
organizations fear that strong stakeholders may decide to stop their cooperation, they may decide to 
behave fairly with weak stakeholders.  
The empirical strategy and the database 
In order to verify whether the data confute our hypotheses we shall compare:  
·  the degree of the adoption of CSR good practices by the three organizations A,B and C; 
·  the belief and dispositions of stakeholders belonging to the different organizations; 
·  the behaviour of the firm towards weak stakeholders.  30 
 
In doing so, we will: 
ü  consider consumers as strong stakeholders (they are obviously valuable to organizations and the 
organizations prefer to cooperate with consumers instead of behaving opportunistically and lose 
their cooperation); 
ü  classify  the  workers  in  two  groups  according  to  their  position  within  the  company.  Workers 
employed at the first, second or third level are considered strong stakeholders (they are essentially 
heads of department or people who have been employed in the organization for a long time). They 
are considered strong stakeholders because they have positions or may have acquired skills by 
staying in the organization which mean that they cannot be replaced at low switching costs. By 
contrast, workers employed in lower positions are considered weak stakeholders, since we suppose 
that the organization may replace them without significant costs; 
ü  carry out the analysis by considering four observational units: the three hypermarkets (A1, B1 and 
B2) belonging to the two cooperative organizations and the two supermarkets (C1) owned by the 
joint-stock company.  
Our data do not allow us to carry out econometric estimates. This is because we only have observations 
from three different organizations and the degree of CSR implementation is measured at the organizational 
level. However, we collected data from 366 questionnaires filled in by workers, consumers and managers of 
the three organizations which give us significant and useful information on the dynamics characterizing the 
relationship between these stakeholders (see Table 2). As we will show, the three case studies represent at 
least an interesting starting point from which to interpret the theoretical model previously presented from 
an empirical point of view and to offer some important insights to enrich the theoretical results. Table 2 
shows  the  number  of  questionnaires  collected  across  organizations/hypermarkets  and  stakeholder 
categories. 
TABLE 2 
Number of questionnaires across organizations and stakeholders 
  Consumers  Strong workers  Weak workers  “CSR manager” 
A1  64  5  36  1 
B1  48  1  42 
1 
B2  60  5  33 
C1  40  14  15  1 
Total  212  25  126  3 
 
The measurement of disposition 
In order to measure the disposition (l) to cooperate with agents who conform with ethical principles of 
fairness  and  cooperation,  we  included  in  our  survey  instrument  a  specific  section  called  “Socio-31 
 
demographic questions”. In what follows, we specify in italics and bold script the names of the variables 
derived from each question and which will be used to summarize our empirical results.  
The variables created in order to measure the level of stakeholders’ l were: 
·  Volunteer: variable equal to 2 if the interviewee had done voluntary work for solidaristic voluntary 
associations over the last 12 months and equal to 1 otherwise; 
·  Benefits,  Ticket,  Evadetax,  Appropriate  and  Damage:  variables  assuming  three  possible  values  (1 
always; 2 – sometimes; 3 – never) as answers to the question “Generally speaking, do you think that the 
following behaviour may be justified?” in relation to the following behaviours: receiving social benefits 
(e.g permission to park in the city centre) without being entitled to them (Benefits); not paying the ticket 
for  public  transport    (Ticket);  evading  taxes  (Evadetax  );  appropriating  money  found  accidentally 
(Appropriate ); running away after damaging a parked car (Damage); 
·  Politics: variables measuring how often the respondent followed the events concerning Italian politics (6 
– Every day; 5 - A few times a week; 4 -Once a week; 3 - A few times a month (less than 4); 2 - A few 
times a year; 1 - Never) 
·  Referendum: number of times the respondent had voted in referendums since s/he came of age (1 –
Never; 2 - less than 50%; 3- more than 50%; 4 - always); 
·  Climate, Safety and Information: variables measuring how worried the respondent was in regard to: 
climate change (Climate); lack of safety in workplaces (Safety); lack of information on consumption 
goods (Information) (from 1 – Not at all to 10 – Entirely); 
·  Taxservices and Taxcivilduty: variables on the level of agreement or disagreement with the following 
two statements (using a 10-point scale, from 1 – completely disagree to 10 – completely agree): paying 
taxes  is  fair  because  it  makes  it  possible  to  produce  services  and  goods  for  all  the  community 
(Taxservices); paying taxes is a civic duty (Taxcivilduty).  
The idea was that these questions could capture the agents’ attention and sensitivity to a general idea 
of social welfare and also their disposition to pay attention to behavior of others which may affect it. For 
instance, some questions regarded the concern with collective problems or issues (such as the variables 
Climate,  Safety,  Information,  Politics,  Referendum),  personal  engagement  in  activities  which  may 
positively affect others’ welfare (variable  Volunteer) or the opinion on free-riding behaviour (Benefits, 
Tickets, Evadetax, Appropriate, Damage, Services, Civilduty). 
The measurement of belief 
In  order  to  measure  the  creation  of  stakeholders’  beliefs  in  the  fair  behavior  of  the  organizations 
towards different stakeholders, we considered the following variables: 
·  Employeeright,  Environment,  Correctinf,  Discrimination,  Involvement,  and  Csrsuppliers:  variables 
measuring the extent to which the respondent believes that “organization A (or B or C depending on the 32 
 
questionnaire)” in carrying out its activity (from 1 – Not at all to 10 – Completely): respects the rights of 
its  employees  and  of  the  employees  of  its  suppliers  (Employeeright);  respects  the  environment 
(Environment); gives correct information on goods sold in its shops (Correctinf); avoids favoritism and 
discrimination  among  workers  (Discrimination);  favors  the  involvement  of  its  employees  in  the 
organization’s activity (Involvement); selects its suppliers by considering their attention to CSR practices 
(Csrsuppliers); 
·  Member/shareholder  Strongworkers  Weakworkers  Suppliers  Consumers,  and  Localcommunity: 
variables measuring the extent to which the  respondent believes that “organization A (or B or C)” 
behaves  fairly  in  dealing  with  the  following  categories  of  subjects  (from  1  –  Not  at  all  to  10  – 
Completely): members (in the case of the consumer cooperatives) or shareholders (in the case of the 
joint-stock  company)  (Member/shareholder);  skilled  workers  such  as  heads  of  departments  etc. 
(Strongworkers);  unskilled  workers  such  as  non-specialized  employees  (Weakworkers);  suppliers 
(Suppliers); consumers (Consumers); the local community (Localcommunity). 
·  Beliefgoods1 and Beliefgoods2: respondent’s belief in the fact that the organization (A,B and C) is doing 
all it can to respect its commitments in relation to specific product lines sold by the organizations and 
characterized,  according  to  organizations’  declarations,  by  specific  qualities  (such  as  goodness, 
genuineness, respect for local tradition etc.).
14 
The measurement of CSR practices adoption 
In  order  to measure the implementation of  CSR  practices  by  the organizations,  we considered  the 
adoption of the following formal CSR instruments (also by specifying some characteristics of the formal 
instruments, such as the degree of involvement of different stakeholders in the creation of the ethical code 
or the specific activities concerning ethical training): 
·  An explicitly declared mission of the organization; 
·  An  ethical  code  (specifying  whether  the  code  has  been  created  by  involving  the  different 
stakeholder categories in order to present the code, discuss its contents, and approve it); 
·  Ethical training (also specifying what it includes); 
                                                           
14 The two consumer cooperatives sell a product line consisting of products (according to their declarations) which are 
safe, good, ethical, eco-friendly and cheap. The joint-stock company sells two different product lines. The first is 
characterized by (according to company’s declarations) safe, good and genuine products and the second by products 
which respect the local tradition and are of high quality. We asked stakeholders in the various organizations if they 
believed (from 1 – Not at all to 10 Completely) that, with respect to these product lines, the organizations (A,B and C), 
were doing all they could to respect their commitments. Since in the empirical analysis we will compare the answers 
given by the stakeholders of the various organizations, we have created two variables. Both of them associate with 
the stakeholders (consumers and workers) of the consumer cooperatives the value of their belief in relation to the 
product line sold by those consumer cooperatives. By contrast, one of these two variables associates with the joint-
stock company’s stakeholders the belief reported in relation to the product line characterized by safe, good and 
genuine products (this variable is named Beliefgoods1). The second variable associates with the joint-stock company’s 
stakeholders the belief reported in relation to other product line (this variable is named Beliefgoods2). 33 
 
·  A Social Report (specifying whether it is organized by stakeholders’ categories); 
·  An internal auditing system. 
The measurement of structural social capital 
In order to have a proxy for the behavior of the organizations towards their weak stakeholders, we 
focused on an objective item of information: the kind of contract (permanent or non-permanent) proposed 
to employees – those characterized by our previous classification between weak and strong workers as 
weak given their position in the organization  – when they entered the organization. According to our 
intuition it may be a good proxy for the attempt by the organization to exploit all the surplus from the 
relation with its weak stakeholders. 
Empirical evidence 
To assess our three hypotheses (H1, H2 and H3) from an empirical point of view, we have decided to 
compare the organizations (A, B and C) and their hypermarkets/supermarkets (A1, B1, B2 and C1) in pairs.  
A)  Test of hypothesis H1 
Hypothesis H1 would not be confuted if we observe that organizations where stakeholders’ l is higher 
also have a greater degree of CSR implementation.  
In regard to CSR implementation, we may rank the three organizations as follows: A better than B and B 
better than C (that is A>B>C). Organization A has adopted the following CSR instruments: an explicitly 
declared mission, an ethical code elaborated by involving all the stakeholders in all the three key moments 
considered (presentation, the discussion of the contents, and approval), a consolidated phase of ethical 
training, a social report and an internal auditing process. Organization B has a codified mission, a significant 
phase of ethical training and a social report. With respect to organization B, organization C does not have a 
phase of ethical training (it simply organizes a welcome day for new employees) and has an ethical code, 
but its elaboration has not involved the stakeholders in the discussion of the norms and principles to 
include  in  the  code.  The  interview  conducted  with  the  CSR  manager  gave  us  the  impression  that 
organization  B  had  decided  not  to  adopt  an  ethical  code  but  was  able  to  fix  its  ethical  principle  of 
cooperation (codified for example in the mission) for example through ethical training. 
In regard to the level of disposition, Table 3 shows the level of l among the organizations’ stakeholders 
in comparative terms. The first column in the table specifies the two hypermarkets/supermarkets belonging 
to the organizations being compared (when we compare, for example, A1 and B1, we would find in the first 
column: A1 > B1 or B1 > A1). The names of the variables measuring l reported in columns 2, 3 and 4 
indicate variables which assume statistically significant higher values for the stakeholders belonging to A1 
or B1 according to the indication in the corresponding row of column 1 (e.g. alternatively: A1 > B1 or B1 > 
A1). Column 2 concerns variables which record different values in respect to consumer dispositions, column 34 
 
3 concerns weak worker dispositions and column 4 strong worker dispositions. For example, the variable 
Damage  in  the  third  column  –  second  row  of  Table  3  means  that  the  distribution  of  this  variable  is 
significantly higher (at 0.6% significance level) for weak workers belonging to A1 than for weak workers 
belonging to B1. Variables Ticket, Climate and Information in the third column – fifth row show that the 
distribution  of  these  variables  is  significantly  higher  (at  0.043%,  0.014%  and  0.002%  significance 
respectively) for weak workers belonging to B2 than for weak workers belonging to A1. 
TABLE 3 





Consumers  Weak workers  Strong workers 
A1>B1  Politics (0.002), Damage (0.030), 
Safety  (0.009),  Taxservices 
(0.039), Taxcivilduty (0.018). 
Damage (0.006)   
B1>A1       
A1>B2       
B2>A1    Ticket  (0.043), 
Climate  (0.014), 
Information (0.002) 
 
A1>C1  Politics  (0.008),  Referendum 
(0.011),  Damage  (0.001), 
Climate  (0.001),  Safety  (0.010), 
Information (0.003) 
   
C1>A1       
B1>C1  Climate (0.020)  Taxcivilduty (0.040)  Safety  (0.009), 
Information (0.001) 
C1>B1       
B2>C1  Referendum  (0.020),  Ticket 
(0.007),  Climate  (0.001), 
Appropriate (0.008), 
Damage (0.003) 
Ticket  (0.019), 
Information (0.006) 
Taxservices  (0.014), 
Taxcivilduty (0.006). 
 
C1>B2       
 
To evaluate the statistical significance of the differences in the variables we used nonparametric tests 
and  applied  the  5%  significance  threshold  [we  performed  the Two-sample Wilcoxon  rank-sum  (Mann-35 
 
Whitney) test by using Stata9, the probability of the test (Prob > |z| = ...) is in brackets, the complete test 
value is available from the authors upon request].  
Table 3 shows quite clearly that: 
·  A1’s stakeholders (in particular consumers) have a  higher disposition than B1’s stakeholders.  
·  A1’s stakeholders (in particular consumers) have a higher disposition than C1’s stakeholders.  
·  B1’s stakeholders (in particular strong workers) have a higher disposition (albeit only in respect to a 
few variables) than C1’s stakeholders. 
·  B2’s stakeholders (in particular consumers and weak workers) have a higher disposition than C1’s 
stakeholders. 
All  these  results  are  consistent  with  the  degree  of  implementation  of  CSR  by  the  organizations 
(remember that A adopted CSR practices at a higher level than B, and B at a higher level than C). This 
finding  seems  not  to  confute  the  possible  positive  role  of  stakeholders’  disposition  in  promoting  the 
decision to adopt CSR practices discussed at a theoretical level. 
In this regard, a curious result concerns the higher disposition of weak workers of B2 compared with 
weak workers of A1. A possible interpretation may relate to the fact that B2 is an hypermarket operating in 
a  location  distant  from  the  headquarters  of  B.    It  is  therefore  possible  that  the  disposition  of  B1’s 
stakeholders, who belong to the area where organization B initially developed its business, had a more 
important role in affecting B’s CSR decision than did B2’s stakeholders. If this is the case, we should look at 
B1’s stakeholders disposition to “interpret” B’s decision of in terms of adoption of CSR practices (and the 
dispositions of B1’s stakeholders are lower than those of A1’s stakeholders, exactly in line with the fact that 
the level of implementation of CSR is higher for organization A than B).   
B)  Test of hypothesis H2 
According to the same logic used to compile Table 3, we created Table 4 with reference to the formation 
of stakeholders’ belief.  Hypothesis H2 would imply that if an organization implements and respects good 
CSR practices, it should be able to create the belief in its “fair” behaviour in its stakeholders. 
By  comparing  the  different  organizations,  according  to  the  same  procedure  used  in  respect  to 
disposition, we find that: 
·  B1’s  stakeholders  (in  particular  consumers  and  weak  workers)  have  a  higher  belief  in  the 
organization’s conformity with CSR practices than do A1’s stakeholders;  
·  B2’s  stakeholders  (in  particular  consumers  and  weak  workers)  have  a  higher  belief  in  the 
organization’s conformity to CSR practices than do A1’s stakeholders; 
·  C1’s stakeholders seem to have lower belief in the organization’s conformity with CSR practices 
than do stakeholders of A1 (even though here some variables related to consumers and weak 36 
 
workers go into the opposite direction, the variables concerning the strong workers that go only in 
one direction seem to support this interpretation), A2 ad B1. 
 
TABLE 4 





Consumers  Weak workers  Strong workers 
A1>B1       
B1>A1  Discrimination  (0.028), 
Involvement(0.011), 
CSRsuppliers (0.002),  
Strongworkers  (0.033), 
Weakworkers  (0.033), 
Suppliers (0.017),  
Localcommunity (0.015) 
Beliefgoods1  (0.001),  Employeeright 
(0.000),  Environment(0.002), 
Correctinf(  0.000),Discrimination 
(0.007),  
Involvement  (0.017),  CSRsuppliers 
(0.000),  
Strongworkers  (0.003),  Weakworkers 




A1>B2       
B2>A1  Beliefgoods1  (0.048), 
Employeeright  (0.001), 
Environment  (0.002), 
Member/shareholder 
(0.003),  Strongworkers 
(0.001),  Weakworkers 
(0.007), Consumers (0.001), 
Localcommunity (0.006) 
Beliefgoods1  (0.000),  Environment 
(0.000),  Correctinf  (0.000), 
Discrimination  (0.000),  Involvement 
(0.000),    CSRsuppliers  (0.000), 
Member/shareholder  (0.003), 
Strongworkers  (0.000),  Weakworkers 
(0.000),  Suppliers  (0.000),  Consumers 
(0.000), Localcommunity (0.000) 
 
A1>C1  Beliefgoods1  (0.010), 
Beliefgoods2  (0.003), 
Environment  (0.020), 
Member/shareholder 
(0.028) 
Member/shareholder (0.001)  Beliefgoods2  (0.025) 
Member/shareholder(0.00
3) Consumers(0.043)  
C1>A1  Strongworkers  (0.000), 
Weakworkers  (0.004), 
Localcommunity (0.033) 
Correctinf  (0.018),  Involvement 
(0.003),   
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B1>C1  Beliefgoods1  (0.005), 
Beliefgoods2  (0.012), 
Environment  (0.005), 
Discrimination  (0.038), 
CSRsuppliers  (0.000) 
Member/shareholder 
(0.005) 
CSRsuppliers  (0.034), 
Member/shareholder  (0.001), 
Strongworkers  (0.020),  Consumers 




C1>B1       
B2>C1  Beliefgoods1  (0.000), 
Beliefgoods2  (0.000), 
Environment  (0.000), 
Member/shareholder 
(0.001) 
Beliefgoods1  (0.006),  Beliefgoods2 
(0.002),  Environment  (0.005), 
CSRsuppliers  (0.001), 
Member/shareholder  (0.000), 
Strongworkers  (0.002),  Weakworkers 
(0.037),  Suppliers  (0.000),  Consumers 
(0.000), Localcommunity (0.002) 
 
C1>B2       
 
Since we cannot verify the real compliance of the organizations with their CSR declarations, we cannot 
use our empirical observations to verify Hypothesis 2. However, on the basis of our data, we may suppose 
that:  
·  organization A does not perfectly comply with its CSR principles. Otherwise, having A a higher level 
of adoption of CSR practices than B, we should observe (if A fully conforms with the CSR principle) a 
higher belief in A’s stakeholders than in B’s; 
·  the compliance of A and B is sufficient to generate in their stakeholders a belief higher than that of 
C’s stakeholders (where the implementation of CSR practices is lower than in A and B). 
C)  Test of hypothesis H3 
The analysis of belief is essential for discussion of our third hypothesis (H3), according to which strong 
stakeholders who obtain a positive ideal utility may be disposed to punish an organization if they observe 
some defection against weak stakeholders. Since ideal utility depends on disposition and belief, we should 
observe organizations in contact with strong stakeholders endowed with high disposition (l) and belief 
avoiding  opportunistic  behaviour  against  weak  stakeholders  in  order  not  to  be  sanctioned  by  strong 
stakeholders.  
If we consider the kind of contract (permanent or non-permanent) proposed to weak workers when 
they entered the organization as a proxy for a “fair” or “unfair” behaviour against them, we note that only 
two significant differences emerge: 38 
 
·  A1 is strictly better in terms of fair behaviour towards weak stakeholders (new weak workers 
employed by the organization) than C1. Considering our sample, 10 out of 36 weak workers of A1 
have been hired for permanent jobs, while none of the 15 weak workers has been hired by C1 for 
permanent jobs. This represents a statistically significant difference: Fisher’s exact 0.024. 
·  B2 is better than C1. 9 out of 42 weak workers of B2 have been hired for permanent jobs while 
none  of  the  15  weak  workers  has  been  hired  by  C1  for  permanent  jobs.  This  represents  a 
statistically significant difference (even though at 10%): Fisher’s exact 0.094. 
Are these results coherent with the level of belief and dispositions observed across organizations? If we 
look  at  the  combination  of  belief  and  disposition,  it  seems  that  this  evidence  is  consistent  with  our 
theoretical result. In fact, strong stakeholders of A1 have both higher dispositions and beliefs than C1’s 
strong stakeholders. Therefore, the ideal utility of A1’s strong stakeholders should be higher than the ideal 
utility of C1’s strong stakeholders. This implies a greater probability that A1’s strong stakeholders will 
punish A1 if they observe it behaving opportunistically against weak stakeholders. It explains the higher 
structural social capital, in terms of a cooperative relationship between the organization and its weak 
stakeholders, of A1 in respect to C1.  
Exactly the same argument applies for the second result (that B2 behaves significantly better with weak 
stakeholders than C1). In fact both the dispositions and beliefs of strong stakeholders (in particular the 
consumers) are significantly higher for B2 than for C1.  
The  last  point  to  consider  is  why  we  do  not  find any  difference  between  the  behavior with  weak 
stakeholders when we consider A1 vs. B1; A1 vs. B2 and B1 vs. C1. In regard to the first pair, this depends 
on the fact that A1’s strong stakeholders have higher dispositions than B1’s strong stakeholders; but exactly 
the opposite holds if we look at the belief. This implies that the ideal utility of the strong stakeholders of 
these two organizations should not differ significantly. In regard to the comparison between A1 and B2, the 
strong stakeholders’ disposition of A1 and B2 does not differ in any variables. Finally, in regard to the 
comparison between B1 and C1, there is a clearly higher belief in B1’s strong stakeholders than in C1’s 
strong stakeholders. However, we have only a few variables which reveal higher dispositions of B1’s strong 
stakeholders compared with C1’s ones. Then there is no clear difference in the behavior of B1 and C1 with 
weak  stakeholders,  even  though,  consistently  with  the  level  of  belief  and  (partly)  with  the  level  of 
dispositions, we find that 6 out of 33 weak workers of B1 have been hired for permanent jobs and all the 
workers  of  C1  have  been  hired  for  non-permanent  jobs  (however,  the  difference  is  not  statistically 
significant at 10%). 
Conclusions 
This paper has investigated the relationship between social capital and corporate social responsibility by 
considering the possibility of a virtuous circle between them. A multidimensional approach to social capital 39 
 
has been adopted. We have distinguished between cognitive social capital, which has been defined in 
terms of disposition to conform with ethical principles of fair cooperation (which  can be understood as  
trustworthiness)  and beliefs in the reciprocity of conformity with such principles by others (which may be 
understood  as  beliefs  expressive  of  trust);  and  structural  social  capital,  understood  as  a  cooperative 
network of relations (which may be defined as a network wherein each link between any two players is a 
cooperative relation whose self-enforceability is endogenous to characteristics  internal to the network 
itself).  
Following  a  contractarian  approach,  CSR  has  been  defined  as  a  model  of  extended  corporate 
governance whereby those who run a firm (entrepreneurs, directors and managers) have responsibilities 
that range from fulfilment of their fiduciary duties towards the owners to fulfilment of analogous fiduciary 
duties towards all the firm’s stakeholders. Such fiduciary duties are obligations undertaken through the 
firm-stakeholders’  social  contract  and  are  expressed  by  the  explicit  endorsement  by  the  firm  of  CSR 
principles, norms of behaviour, managerial standards and tools. In regard to the firm’s stakeholders, we 
introduced a distinction between strong and weak ones. As long as only material payoffs are considered, 
the firm is interested in cooperating in the long term with strong stakeholders, while it is not interested in 
cooperating with weak stakeholders.  
Finally, we have also introduced the concept of conformist preferences. According to this notion, agents 
do not pursue material advantages alone. They also obtain a positive psychological utility by conforming 
with  ethical  principles  (in  our  analysis  the  CSR  principles  and  norms  of  fair  cooperation  and  the 
corresponding CSR managerial standards and tools) when they believe and observe that also other players 
with which they are associated are reciprocally conforming with the same principles.  
Our analysis has shown that cognitive social capital (understood as both disposition and belief) and the 
adoption of CSR principles, norms, managerial standards and tools generate endogenous incentives for the 
firm to comply with the  content of such principles and hence to cooperate fairly also with their weak 
stakeholders.  
Our argument can be summarised in five points. 
1.  The disposition of stakeholders favours the adoption of CSR principles and standards of behaviour by 
the firm. A firm that operates in contact with stakeholders characterized by a high level of cognitive 
social capital has incentives to adopt CSR principles and implement CSR practices. In fact, stakeholders 
endowed  with  high  levels  of  disposition  to  comply  with  social  norms  of  fairness  and  cooperation 
(cognitive social capital) will decide to trust a firm that endorses and complies with CSR principles and 
norms sooner than stakeholders with low levels of cognitive social capital. If the cooperation between 
the  firm  and  its  stakeholders  is  only  dependent  on  self  interest  and  reputation,  the  firm  must 
accumulate a reputation through a long and costly history of unilateral cooperation with its stakeholders 
before the first of them is persuaded to trust the firm.  In some contexts, like the one considered here, 40 
 
this  approach  would  not  work,  since  the  firm  may  not  have  enough  incentive  to  systematically 
cooperate with all its stakeholder even in the long run. By contrast, if at least some stakeholders and the 
firm are endowed with conformist dispositions, and they see each another adopting and respecting CSR 
principles  and  standards  of  behaviour  that  support  beliefs  of  reciprocal  conformity,  then  they  will 
develop conformist preferences. They therefore start to reciprocate cooperation well before they would 
do under the hypothesis that they care only about their material payoff in the long run.  At the same 
time,  they  react  against  non-compliance  with  CSR  much  more  severely  than  they  would  if  only 
reputation associated with mutual advantages were at stake.  
2.  Through explicit endorsement and implementation over the time of CSR principles, standards and tools 
by the firm, stakeholders create their beliefs about the type of the firm with which they are interacting. 
The basic social contract simulated by the endorsement of CSR principles and standards elicits a priori 
beliefs about conformity (because of a default reasoning). Then, repeated observation of the firm’s 
behaviour throughout all its relations in the network compared with the CSR standard of reference 
induces an updating of beliefs that confirms or refutes the hypothesis that the firm is a conformist 
player.  
3.  Conformity  beliefs  and  dispositions  may  induce  strong  stakeholders  to  cooperate  with  the  firm: 
cooperation in fact is the behaviour by which stakeholders reciprocate conformity with CSR principles 
on  the  part  of  the  firm.  Cooperation  then  depends  on  the  formation  of  the  correct  belief  about 
reciprocal  conformity  with  CSR  principles  and  on  the  pre-existing  level  of  l  (disposition).  But, 
importantly, this happens if and only if the firm is cooperative also with its weak stakeholders. In fact, 
because opportunistic behaviour with weak stakeholders is a violation of CSR principles, it induces the 
strong stakeholders to change their initial beliefs about the firm’s consistency with its declared CSR 
principles and rules of behaviour. Expected non-conformity destroys the psychological preference for 
conformity and greatly reduces the cooperative payoff for strong stakeholders.  
4.  The possibility that strong stakeholders may decide not to cooperate with the firm if it defects with 
weak  stakeholders  is  a  reliable  threat  for  the  firm  and  may  induce  it  to  cooperate  with  weak 
stakeholders as well, in order to avoid the sanction from strong stakeholders. 
5.  This generates sustainable networks of cooperative relations involving the firm and its strong and weak 
stakeholders (structural social capital), that would not be sustainable without the threat of the sanction 
from the strong stakeholders. This sanction, however, is not an exogenous factor (as in the case of an 
external  enforcing  mechanism  introduced  from  outside  the  model);  rather,  it  is  determined  by 
endogenous incentives which we have explained by considering the impact of cognitive social capital 
and conformist preferences on stakeholders’ behaviour.  
We have also presented the analysis of three original case studies used to discuss the theoretical results 
of the paper from an empirical point of view. Even though the empirical analysis should be considered as 41 
 
exploratory  in  nature,  our  observations  are  consistent  with  our  hypothetical  predictions.  Hence  the 
empirical evidence seems to corroborate the theory. 
Our findings generate numerous questions and ideas for further research. In particular, by highlighting a 
new important role of social capital, they encourage further theoretical and empirical analysis of the factors 
and policies that may increase cognitive social capital in terms of disposition to cooperate, which is a key 
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